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Sixty-eighth session
Agenda item 69 (b)
Promotion and protection of human rights: human rights questions, including alternative approaches for improving the effective enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms

Note verbale dated 1 October 2013 from the Permanent Mission of Cuba to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

The Permanent Mission of Cuba to the United Nations presents its compliments to the Secretary-General of the United Nations and has the honour to transmit herewith the declaration of the Fourth Cuban Civil Society Forum for the Liberation of the Five Heroes, held in Havana on 20 September 2013 (see annex).

The Permanent Mission of Cuba would be grateful if the present note and its annex could be circulated as a document of the General Assembly under agenda item 69 (b).

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Annex to the note verbale dated 1 October 2013 from the Permanent Mission of Cuba to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Declaration of the Fourth Cuban Civil Society Forum for the Liberation of the Five Heroes

Havana, 20 September 2013

The fourth forum of Cuban civil society organizations and international organizations based in Cuba for the liberation of the Five Cuban Heroes, gathered in Cuba on the occasion of the world day for their release, reiterates its denunciation and condemnation of the unjust imprisonment of Gerardo Hernández, Ramón Labañino, Antonio Guerrero and Fernando González, who have been held in the United States for 15 years. One of the heroes, René González, returned to Cuba recently after serving his full sentence. It would be unacceptable and extremely cruel to apply the same criterion to the other four, because their sentences are much longer and, if that were to happen, Gerardo Hernández would die in prison.

The five heroes were given excessive sentences for crimes that were never proven in their rigged trial in Miami, which was held without due process in an extremely hostile climate, as has been shown by the attorneys for the defence and recognized by prestigious international organizations of independent jurists.

Before and after the trial, and while the jury was deliberating, the United States Government made secret and illegal payments to journalists in return for articles giving the public and the jury the impression that the five Cubans were guilty. On those grounds alone, that trial should be declared void.

The United States attorney's office failed to prove any of the charges, and the court unjustly passed life sentences on defendants who had not acquired or handed over any secret information and had not harmed the United States.

These five patriots monitored terrorist anti-Cuban organizations, which have operated with impunity for years in the United States, to prevent new destructive acts against Cuba.

On 27 May 2005, the United Nations Working Group on Arbitrary Detention determined that their deprivation of liberty was arbitrary and urged the United States Government to take the necessary steps to rectify the situation.

The Cuban heroes have been the victims of cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment and punishment intended to break their will and make them confess to crimes they never committed. Their relatives have also suffered harassment and the violation of their rights; some have borne the pain of not being able to visit them as a result of bans imposed by the United States authorities.

In the face of this injustice, the Forum of Cuban civil society organizations has a moral, civic and humanitarian duty to denounce the case of the Five, to help publicize the manner in which the United States has contravened its own laws, legal procedures and regulations, and to highlight the gross legal and human rights violations committed in order to condemn them and keep them in prison for 15 years.

Because international public opinion and the United States people remain completely unaware of the case, the United States Government has been able to deny its responsibility. Four Cuban counter-terrorists remain imprisoned, and their human rights and those of their relatives are being violated.

We, the organizations of Cuban civil society, ask the United States people and all men and women of good will to hear and support our demand for the immediate release of our Cuban brothers who are unjustly held in United States prisons. From this Forum, we ask the President of the United States, Mr. Barack Obama, to put an end to this outrage, and to uphold justice and the rule of law in his country by immediately releasing Gerardo, Ramón, Antonio and Fernando, and by using his prerogative to right the wrongs committed by previous administrations in handling this case.

The fourth forum of Cuban civil society organizations for the liberation of our counter-terrorist fighters expects and respectfully requests the President of the United States, Barack Obama, to agree to our call, which is the outcry of the men and women of the valiant Cuban people.

Mr. President Obama, everyone believes 15 years is too long!

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Agenda item 71
Assistance to survivors of the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, particularly orphans, widows and victims of sexual violence

Assistance to survivors of the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, particularly orphans, widows and victims of sexual violence

Report of the Secretary-General

Summary

The present report is submitted to the General Assembly pursuant to resolution 66/228. It provides a status report on and an analysis of the current challenges to the delivery of relief and rehabilitation assistance by the United Nations and its partners to survivors of the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, in addition to recommendations for appropriate ways to meet those survivors' remaining needs.

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I. Introduction

1. The present report is submitted to the General Assembly in compliance with resolution 66/228, in which the Assembly requested the Secretary-General to encourage the relevant agencies, funds and programmes of the United Nations system to provide assistance to survivors of the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, particularly in the areas of education for orphans, medical care and treatment for victims of sexual violence, including HIV-positive victims, trauma and psychological counselling, and skills training and microcredit programmes; to support activities aimed at genocide victim remembrance and genocide prevention; to support efforts to enhance judicial capacity-building and victim support; and to propose specific recommendations for appropriate solutions to the remaining needs of survivors of the genocide. The Assembly also called upon Member States to support the efforts of the International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals to conclude the remaining cases.

II. Review of major developments

2. Some 19 years since the 1994 genocide against the Tutsi in Rwanda, the country has steadily recovered and is on the path to a more promising future. Indeed, as a result of an ambitious agenda outlined in Vision 2020 (a government development programme) and the two subsequent poverty reduction strategies, Rwanda is experiencing one of the swiftest periods of growth and socioeconomic progress in its history. The Government has made attaining the Millennium Development Goals central to its development strategy and, two years ahead of schedule, the country has achieved or is on track to achieving all the Goals, with the exception of Goal 1. The poverty rate fell by an unprecedented 12 percentage points between 2005/06 and 2010/11, implying that 1 million children, men and women have left poverty since 2008, with the sharpest declines registered in rural areas. The poverty rate remains high, however, at about 45 per cent.

3. Growth is predominantly driven by the service sector, which is the biggest contributor to the country's gross domestic product (GDP). Within that sector, the main drivers are the telecommunications sector, the developing wholesale and retail trade and transport and tourism. Furthermore, sound macroeconomic reforms have been reinforced by sustained improvements in the business environment. This performance was reflected in the improved ranking of Rwanda in the World Bank's annual "ease of doing business" index for 2012. Its rise from 150th position in 2008 to 45th position in 2012 places the country's economy second in the world in terms of most reforms undertaken.

4. The country's long-term development goals are contained in Vision 2020 and the current economic development and poverty reduction strategy, which covers the period 2013-2018. The overriding long-term national development objective is to transform Rwanda into a middle-income country with a knowledge-based economy by 2020. Special focus will be put on empowering and investing in young people and women, which is an integral part of the priorities of the economic development and poverty reduction strategy. In particular, steps have been taken to promote savings and credit facilities among young people and women through cooperatives and other initiatives. The Government is placing significant emphasis on

entrepreneurship training, with several initiatives targeting women and young people.

5. Promoting shared economic growth and reducing poverty remain important government priorities in order to meet the long-term national development objective. The Government continues to implement social protection strategies aimed at uplifting the very poor. The Vision 2020 Umurenge Programme, with three key pillars — the public works programme, direct cash transfers and a microcredit scheme — aims to make Vision 2020 and the economic development and poverty reduction strategy operational, and to directly reduce poverty at the community level, through the creation of employment opportunities for the poor and by providing cash to the poorest and most vulnerable households. The Government is also continuing to implement a one cow per family programme to improve the income-earning potential of households. The Programme has contributed to addressing the direct needs and demands of the population, especially the poorest and marginalized groups, while also providing the necessary space for local government action and involvement in the efficient delivery of public services. Supported by the *Imihigo* system (performance contracts), the programme has helped to reinforce the capacity of other service delivery agents.

6. The Government continues to demonstrate strong leadership and ownership of the development process by implementing several mechanisms to enhance aid effectiveness and coordination among development partners, in addition to facilitating a favourable environment for effective development cooperation. This provides a tremendous opportunity for the United Nations and development partners to support the Government in its efforts to attain the Millennium Development Goals and Vision 2020.

7. In the area of governance, Rwanda has made significant progress in national reconciliation, law and order and accountability, as well as in the rebuilding and strengthening of national capacity for good governance. Fostering and promoting democratic governance is a major development objective for the Government and its development partners, which is why governance issues are defined as priorities in both Vision 2020 and the economic development and poverty reduction strategy.

8. Rwanda has efficiently implemented reforms in the justice sector with new laws, new justice architecture and the use of traditional justice mechanisms such as *gacaca* courts and community-based mechanisms such as community mediators (*abunzi*), in addition to access to justice bureaux, so as to expand avenues for universal access to justice. These efforts notwithstanding, the need for access to justice remains high and, for many, unmet. The Rwanda governance scorecard for 2012, released by the Rwanda Governance Advisory Council, showed an improvement in the rule of law score (an increase from 67.71 per cent in 2010 to 73.37 per cent in 2012). This increase is mostly due to the remarkable improvement in the access to legal aid indicator, which rose from 42 per cent in 2010 to 67.18 per cent in 2012. Efforts to ensure that the rights of all citizens are equally respected are the core business of the National Human Rights Commission, which in 2011 received 982 human rights cases, of which 473 have been resolved. The remainder are under investigation.

9. HIV prevalence is relatively low (3 per cent among people between 15 and 49 years of age). Currently, 91 per cent of adults requiring antiretroviral drugs have access to them and prevention of mother-to-child transmission coverage stands at

87 per cent. Regional variations in HIV prevalence exist, however, with prevalence of 7.1 per cent in Kigali (9.4 per cent among women, 5.1 per cent among men), compared with 2.3 per cent in rural areas.

10. Rwanda is on track to achieve universal access to primary education by 2015. There has been sustained progress in access to education, with the primary net enrolment rate increasing to 95.4 per cent in 2011. Gender parity at the primary level has been achieved, with the net enrolment rate for girls reaching 97.5 per cent, compared with 94.3 per cent for boys. Furthermore, Rwanda has made important strides in gender equality and women's empowerment. Parliament is unique in that the majority of its members are women (56.3 per cent).

III. Current challenges to development

11. The country's rapid economic growth over the past decade notwithstanding, its productive base remains narrow. The economy continues to be dominated by the service sector and agriculture, accounting for some 47 and 32 per cent, respectively, of GDP in 2012, compared with only 15 per cent for the industrial sector. Furthermore, the competitiveness of industrial exports continues to be challenged by a narrow domestic market and the country's landlocked location, which increases transportation and energy costs.

12. The total number of poor people in the country fell significantly during the first economic development and poverty reduction strategy (covering the period 2008-2012), as did the extreme poverty rate. Nevertheless, the number of poor people and the extreme poverty rate remain persistently high, especially in rural areas. Although poverty rates fell more in rural areas than in urban areas from 2008 to 2011, the rate in rural areas remains at 48.7 per cent, compared with 22.1 per cent in urban areas, according to the most recent integrated household living conditions survey. Although all provinces experienced reductions in poverty during the first economic development and poverty reduction strategy, there were significant variations by district and province. In addition, the Gini coefficient remains high (0.49), the gains made towards the reduction of inequalities notwithstanding. The Rwandan poverty profile indicates that women are more affected by poverty than men, with 47 per cent of female-headed households classified as poor, compared with 44.9 per cent of all households. A key challenge for the second economic development and poverty reduction strategy is therefore to ensure sustained growth and poverty reduction nationwide and among all groups.

13. While gains in democratic governance have been made, important challenges remain. There is a need to reinforce inclusive participation in the political process by tackling the issue of political space, in addition to weaknesses in the capacity of civil society and the media. There is also a need to accelerate judicial reforms in order to improve access to high-quality justice, reduce the backlog of cases and improve the quality of the prosecution.

14. According to figures from the National Institute of Statistics for 2012, Rwanda has a population density of 416 people per square km, making it one of the most densely populated countries in Africa. While that demographic reality is an opportunity, it brings with it risks and puts pressure on the economy. The combination of population density, significant demographic growth (a population growth rate of about 2.7 per cent and a fertility rate of 4.9 children per woman of

reproductive age) and poverty places considerable pressure on the limited natural resource base, especially land, resulting in incidences of food insecurity in some parts of the country. In addition, widespread environmental degradation is undermining access by the poor to the land and natural resources on which they depend for their livelihoods.

15. Insufficient investment in infrastructure for energy, water and sanitation and transportation, coupled with the combined pressures of agricultural production, high population growth, economic expansion and rising energy needs, is increasing the environmental strain on Rwanda. Consequently, there is a need for adequate financing and capacity-building in order for the Government to deliver the necessary services in support of attaining the Millennium Development Goals.

16. Following the closure of the *gacaca* courts in 2012, justice and accountability with regard to emerging genocide cases remain a concern. The Genocide Fugitive Tracking Unit, established to build on the work of those courts, continues to lack adequate capacity to bring to justice the large numbers of Rwandan genocide suspects in foreign countries.

17. Regional peace and stability is critical to the sustainable development of Rwanda. The recurring conflict in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo continues to have a negative impact on regional stability, with more than 70,000 Congolese refugees currently sheltering in Rwanda. A new comprehensive approach to tackling recurring cycles of violence in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, promoted by the Secretary-General, led 11 countries, including Rwanda, to sign the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework for the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Region on 24 February 2013 in Addis Ababa. The Framework is a comprehensive approach that involves action at the national level in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, action at the regional level to address the legitimate concerns and interests of all the countries in the Great Lakes region and action at the international level in support of those initiatives.

IV. United Nations support

18. The United Nations provides technical and financial assistance through the Rwanda National Police in support of crime prevention programmes. Such support has resulted in the creation of anti-crime clubs in schools and communities. The community policing mechanism has improved the system of crime reduction and prevention by reinforcing national policing efforts to ensure law and order and personal security.

19. Awareness-raising activities for young people on crime prevention and reduction in high schools and universities and anti-crime clubs, as well as for the general population through local leaders, have contributed to crime prevention and, most importantly, to efforts to combat the genocide ideology.

20. The United Nations has also partnered with the national police in training police officers, in particular female officers, to combat gender-based violence. That training has equipped female officers with the skills to investigate and adequately respond to cases of gender-based violence and provide the required and appropriate support to victims.

21. With the support of the United Nations, 37 health-care providers, 65 gender focal points from the national police and 66 community leaders from the gender-based violence committees established at the sector level, in addition to community policing units and associations of people living with HIV, received training on gender-based violence and HIV prevention. They were also given help to build partnerships aimed at strengthening community prevention of and response to gender-based violence.

22. In addition, the United Nations strengthened the one-stop centres that provide holistic services to survivors of gender-based violence, reaching 4,714 such survivors (49 per cent women, 46 per cent children and 5 per cent men). The success of the centre model saw Rwanda selected to host a centre of excellence in the area of gender-based violence prevention and response for the region. The United Nations supported the Ministry of Health, both technically and financially, in the finalization of a national scale-up strategy for the centres. The Organization also contributed to the strengthening and implementation of a multisectoral HIV/AIDS prevention and treatment approach for better coordination and research. As a result of the development of strategic plans on HIV and elimination of mother-to-child transmission, Rwanda is on track to achieve universal access to HIV testing and treatment, with coverage now at 95 per cent.

23. In 2010, the United Nations supported the Government, through the National Unity and Reconciliation Commission, in the production of the first national reconciliation barometer. It is continuing to work on a follow-up study and to explore policy actions needed to further reduce occurrences of genocide-related crimes. Furthermore, the United Nations supported the Commission in the organization of community dialogues on unity and reconciliation, in addition to the establishment of unity and reconciliation clubs in schools and communities.

24. In the area of justice, the United Nations supported the closing of the *gacaca* processes. It will continue to contribute to the work of documenting the *gacaca* legacy and honouring the memories of the genocide victims. At the closing of the *gacaca* jurisdictions in December 2012, they had tried 1,958,634 cases.

25. Upon completing its work in June 2012, the National Gacaca Service provided the Genocide Fugitive Tracking Unit with a list of 71,658 genocide fugitives convicted in absentia whose whereabouts were unknown. The Unit plans to reinforce its capacity to bring to justice the large numbers of Rwandan genocide suspects in foreign countries. It is against this backdrop that the United Nations is currently supporting the National Public Prosecution Authority, through the Ministry of Justice, to complement the successful *gacaca* experience through the special chamber of the High Court for crimes against humanity. Technical assistance is being provided to support the Unit through research, investigations, advocacy and outreach. Furthermore, there is a need for a strategy to monitor the healing process and to deal with some of the challenges that Rwandan society continues to face, especially those relating to restoring property and assets.

26. An international residual mechanism for criminal tribunals was established by the Security Council in its resolution 1966 (2010) as part of the United Nations strategy to phase out the international criminal tribunals for Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia. The Arusha branch of the Mechanism took over from the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda on 1 July 2012, although, according to the

transitional arrangements annexed to the resolution, the Tribunal has competence to complete all trial or referral proceedings that were pending with it as at that date.

27. In partnership with the Ministry of Justice, the United Nations supported the establishment of access to justice bureaux and local committees of mediators, which will provide legal advice and mediation to citizens as part of transitional justice mechanisms. Since 2008, the Organization has supported, through the Ministry, the provision of legal aid and legal assistance, especially to the most vulnerable.

28. The United Nations has also provided support to the Association of Genocide Widows to facilitate training activities in various areas, including counselling and basic knowledge and information-sharing. The victims of the genocide have been empowered to provide technical support to the national police to effectively respond to the needs of victims of sexual-based violence. This is an indication that members of the Association, who began as vulnerable victims, have been empowered, not only as survivors but also as important actors in tackling sexual and gender-based violence.

29. In terms of economic empowerment, the United Nations continues to support capacity-building initiatives of members of the Association of Genocide Widows and Benimpuhwe to develop and enhance their skills in handicrafts and the production of peace baskets (*agaseke*) for export. This initiative has proved to be one of the most successful strategies in tackling sexual and gender-based violence, given that poverty is one of the main drivers of vulnerability to such violence.

30. The United Nations is also supporting the Association of Genocide Widows through a project aimed at building the capacity of paralegals in property and inheritance rights, raising the awareness of members and beneficiaries of the Association living with HIV/AIDS about their property and inheritance rights and providing legal assistance on property and succession disputes.

31. In 2011-2012, the United Nations supported the Association through a two-day training course on gender, HIV and conflict among widows in Mugombwa sector. The 100 widows who participated raised issues that were prohibiting them from enjoying their rights, such as access to land belonging to their husbands' families. After the training, the Executive Secretary for Mugombwa sector and the community mediators participated in resolving the issues. The training on inheritance law helped the widows to understand their rights, which they are now able to claim with the support of paralegals.

32. In 2012, in order to reduce vulnerability, the United Nations supported efforts to raise the awareness of women living with or affected by HIV/AIDS regarding their property and inheritance rights. In this regard, 6,418 genocide widows and orphans, including HIV-positive people, based in Kigali and Southern Province received awareness-raising assistance from paralegals. A total of 5,504 (86 per cent) have taken the initiative to fight for their right to land and 3,302 (51 per cent) have received positive solutions to their problems as a result of the assistance provided. In total, 202 cases of genocide widows and orphans living with HIV/AIDS have been brought before courts and tribunals.

33. The United Nations provided support to enhance knowledge and awareness of the need to protect women's property and inheritance rights among those responsible for the development, revision and implementation of relevant legal frameworks and processes. A total of 102 paralegals have been trained in how to

protect widows' property and inheritance rights in the context of HIV/AIDS. In addition, legal mobile clinics have been put in place and have helped lawyers and paralegals to contact beneficiaries. This contributes to minimizing beneficiaries' costs and other possible barriers when seeking advice from paralegals and lawyers.

34. The United Nations supported the observance of International Widows' Day on 27 June 2013 in Mugombwa sector. The ceremony was attended by the deputy mayor of Gisagara district, representatives of the army and the police and representatives of Unity Club, Pro femmes/Twese Hamwe and other civil society organizations. Also present were 331 widows from the district, who shared testimonies of the achievements and challenges of widowhood since 1994.

35. In terms of support to children, the United Nations continues to support the association Uyisenga n'Imanzi, which is involved mainly in raising awareness of the mental health problems of child survivors of the genocide. In terms of other support from the Organization, 179 members of peace basket cooperatives have been trained in cooperative management, business development and marketing. In addition, more than 800 basket weavers have been trained in leadership and civic education. Most cooperative members are widows, including genocide survivors.

36. Each year, the Federation of United Nations Staff Associations reaches out to communities affected by the trauma of the genocide as part of its contribution to the national healing process.

37. In remembrance of the victims of the 1994 genocide who were United Nations staff members, a memorial was built on the premises of the Office of the United Nations Resident Coordinator and officially inaugurated in April 1995. A new memorial was inaugurated by the Chair of the United Nations Development Group in October 2012 as a way of renewing the memories of those who perished.

V. Conclusions and recommendations

38. Rwanda has made remarkable progress in promoting peace and stability since 1994, which has translated into improved economic performance. The country continues to faces challenges in sustaining these gains and attaining all the Millennium Development Goals by 2015, however. The Government has made achievement of the Goals central to its policy framework, as defined in the economic development and poverty reduction strategies. The Government continues to demonstrate strong leadership and ownership of the development process by implementing several mechanisms to enhance aid effectiveness and coordination among development partners and by facilitating a favourable environment for effective development cooperation. The United Nations system is a strong partner of the Government in its determination to ensure a bright future for the people of Rwanda. The Organization will continue to provide strategic advice and support national efforts to sustain the gains made to date in consolidating unity, peace and reconciliation, the rule of law, human rights and shared economic growth, in addition to the efficient provision of basic social services, in particular for the most vulnerable.

39. Following the selection of Rwanda as one of the eight "Delivering as one" pilot countries in 2007, the second United Nations Development Assistance Framework was implemented, further consolidating United Nations support to the

country and enhancing the coherence and the efficiency of operations. A new development assistance framework, the United Nations Development Assistance Plan for the period 2013-2018, has been approved by the Government and the United Nations country team and has been aligned with the second economic development and poverty reduction strategy, which covers the same period. This alignment affords an important opportunity for the United Nations system to show its commitment to the principles and practices of the Paris Declaration and the Accra Agenda for Action and to respond to the most pressing issues that affect the lives of the population, especially the most vulnerable. Alignment with government priorities will also help to strengthen the role of United Nations agencies in donor harmonization and coordination processes.

40. Within the overall framework of United Nations assistance to genocide survivors, efforts are under way to improve access to high-quality justice for all and witness protection programmes. The *gacaca* courts tried more than 1.9 million cases in a period of only 10 years and contributed to the unity and reconciliation of Rwandans while ensuring justice for genocide victims. Their closure was an important milestone in the healing process in post-genocide Rwanda. While the courts records have been entrusted to the National Commission for the Fight against Genocide, the Commission is not equipped with an adequate system to protect the files efficiently. Support will be required so that the Commission is able to establish a digitalized filing system that will ensure that those files, which are critical to the legacy of the *gacaca* courts and the genocide, are adequately maintained and accessible for future use. Further support will be required for the Genocide Fugitive Tracking Unit of the Ministry of Justice and the special chamber of the High Court for crimes against humanity.

41. In the area of governance, further support will be needed to promote the participation of young people and women in the democratic process, including in decision-making at the national and local levels. Support will also be required to improve access to high-quality preventive, curative, promotional and rehabilitative services, especially for victims of sexual violence, HIV-positive persons and women and children; enhance trauma and psychological support programmes; and promote effective safety nets for the protection of the most vulnerable groups.

42. Further areas of support include victim support, in the form of improved housing and associated amenities for vulnerable groups such as orphans, widows, returnees and the internally displaced. Assistance will also be required for livelihood initiatives, orphans and vulnerable children, protection against gender-based violence, the creation of educational opportunities and the formulation and implementation of gender-sensitive social and economic policies that favour the poor and the disadvantaged.

43. Supporting groups to build sustainable enterprises and other income-generating activities through capacity-building, microcredit and access to markets will remain a priority in order to promote self-sufficiency and alleviate poverty. In addition, provision of support to special initiatives aimed at addressing the needs of those who have experienced physical injuries resulting in mental and/or physical disabilities will be critical, as will support for ageing genocide survivors.

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Sixty-eighth session
Agenda item 70 (d)
Strengthening of the coordination of humanitarian and disaster relief assistance of the United Nations, including special economic assistance: strengthening of international cooperation and coordination of efforts to study, mitigate and minimize the consequences of the Chernobyl disaster

Optimizing the international effort to study, mitigate and minimize the consequences of the Chernobyl disaster

Report of the Secretary-General

Summary

The present report is submitted in accordance with General Assembly resolution 65/131 on the strengthening of international cooperation and coordination of efforts to study, mitigate and minimize the consequences of the Chernobyl disaster. In the resolution, the Assembly requested the Secretary-General to submit to it at its sixty-eighth session a report containing a comprehensive assessment of the implementation of all aspects of the resolution.

The report records the activities undertaken by the funds, programmes and specialized agencies of the United Nations system to promote recovery from the Chernobyl disaster. It emphasizes the importance of the ongoing inter-agency cooperation, depicts the role of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in coordinating inter-agency efforts on the implementation of the Decade of Recovery and Sustainable Development of the Affected Regions (2006-2016) and emphasizes that the United Nations will continue to address the pending needs of the Chernobyl-affected communities. The report concludes that the organizations and bodies of the United Nations system are committed to the goal of helping the Chernobyl-affected communities to return to normalcy, assisting the most vulnerable and ensuring the long-term sustainable development of the affected territories. United Nations country teams will make a continuous effort to keep the issue of post-Chernobyl recovery high on the inter-agency and international agendas.

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In the remaining years of realizing the United Nations action plan on Chernobyl to 2016, UNDP, in its role as lead agency for United Nations activities on Chernobyl, is prepared to lead the dialogue with the relevant organizations of the United Nations system and Member States on the future of inter-agency cooperation on Chernobyl and other man-made disasters. It is committed to giving a stronger voice to the human dimension of preparedness for and recovery from nuclear emergencies at the United Nations level and to incorporating that knowledge and experience into UNDP developmental programming worldwide.

I. General situation

1. Since the accident at the Chernobyl nuclear plant on 26 April 1986, the affected regions of Belarus, the Russian Federation and Ukraine have been supported by a broad range of United Nations initiatives. In 2004, the Secretary-General announced the transfer of the responsibility for United Nations coordination of Chernobyl activities from the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs of the Secretariat to the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). In place of the emergency humanitarian assistance delivered in the 1990s, the United Nations opted to focus on a "development approach", the creation of new livelihoods, better economic opportunities and the restoration of community self-reliance and self-sufficiency. The General Assembly endorsed that approach and proclaimed 2006-2016, the third decade since the Chernobyl accident, as the Decade of Recovery and Sustainable Development of the Affected Regions. The United Nations action plan on Chernobyl to 2016 was agreed by the relevant organization of the United Nations system as a practical framework for cooperation during the Decade. During the midterm review of the action plan, the agencies agreed on priorities for the second half of the Decade.

2. On 28 March 2012, UNDP organized an inter-agency coordination meeting on Chernobyl at the headquarters of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in Vienna. It focused on United Nations activities in the second half of the United Nations action plan on Chernobyl to 2016. The organizations agreed that the overall shift to the development phase in Chernobyl-related programming had been working well and that the targeted assistance should continue in the remaining years of the Decade of Recovery.

3. The Governments of the three most-affected countries have put significant effort into overcoming the legacy of Chernobyl (for the reports of Belarus and Ukraine describing Government recovery efforts, see annexes I and II). Constructive joint work by the organizations and bodies of the United Nations system has been encouraging. Community-based projects in the Chernobyl-affected areas have helped to improve the livelihoods of people. The International Chernobyl Research and Information Network project has been working to provide information to local populations in accessible, non-technical language. At the Chernobyl nuclear power plant, significant progress has been made on the construction of the new safe confinement and on the development of infrastructure for safe, long-term management of radioactive waste.

4. At the same time, the Chernobyl-affected areas continue to face numerous socioeconomic challenges, such as the lack of economic opportunities and stigma associated with Chernobyl. Young people and skilled workers tend to move away, investors shun the region, and joblessness is high.

II. Coordination of the work of the United Nations on Chernobyl

5. The transfer of system-wide responsibility for recovery efforts to UNDP from the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs marked an important change in the United Nations strategy on Chernobyl, namely, a shift from humanitarian response to developmental assistance. Since 2004, the Administrator

of UNDP has been serving as the United Nations Coordinator of International Cooperation on Chernobyl, facilitating the joint effort of 12 organizations of the United Nations system, Belarus, the Russian Federation and Ukraine. The Office of Coordination of International Cooperation on Chernobyl functions as part of the UNDP Regional Bureau for Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent States, and manages day-to-day coordination responsibilities.

6. In order to share information and ensure better coordination, UNDP organized meetings of the Inter-Agency Task Force on 26 January 2011, 26 April 2012 and 23 May 2013. The Administrator of UNDP chaired the meeting in 2013 and the Associate Administrator chaired them in 2011 and 2012. The meetings involved more than 70 participants in 12 different locations. Such wide participation demonstrated the continued engagement of the United Nations family in Chernobyl-related efforts and the commitment of the United Nations and other organizations to helping to empower communities in their recovery efforts.

7. The 30 March 2012 planning and coordination workshop on the United Nations action plan on Chernobyl to 2016 was held at IAEA headquarters. It attracted the participation of international organizations (IAEA, the World Health Organization (WHO), the World Bank, the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, UNDP and the United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation) and the national authorities of the three Chernobyl-affected countries and provided a platform for discussion, in particular on progress with the implementation of the action plan. The participants discussed the need for continuing international assistance in addressing the problems of the Chernobyl-affected areas. Namely, participants agreed on the importance of developing initiatives by the United Nations family aimed at the recovery and development of the Chernobyl-affected communities, in particular with a focus on the prevention of peatlands/forest fires.

III. Ongoing United Nations assistance efforts

8. In the course of implementing the United Nations action plan on Chernobyl to 2016, United Nations country teams in each of the three most-affected countries have continued to provide an excellent example of joint United Nations action in pursuing a developmental approach to Chernobyl programmes. The activities have been organized into 10 main categories: (a) provision of scientifically sound information on the effects of the Chernobyl accident; (b) community-based development; (c) subregional cooperation; (d) policy advice; (e) infrastructure; (f) health; (g) radiation mitigation and standard-setting; (h) reactor safety and nuclear waste management; (i) environmental security; and (j) other initiatives.

A. Provision of scientifically sound information on the effects of the Chernobyl accident

9. The International Chernobyl Research and Information Network programme, aimed at enhancing human security in the Chernobyl-affected areas of Belarus, the Russian Federation and Ukraine, is an example of a joint United Nations initiative, from design to implementation. The organizations involved (IAEA, UNDP, the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) and WHO) work on disseminating

information about the consequences of the Chernobyl nuclear accident in the form of practical advice on healthy and productive lifestyles to the residents of the Chernobyl-affected areas.

10. Funded by the United Nations Trust Fund for Human Security, and officially launched in 2009, the programme aims to reach an estimated 150,000 to 200,000 people by 2013. Provision of the latest scientific knowledge about the accident's consequences on health and the environment is helping to dispel misconceptions and to empower the affected communities to maximize social and economic recovery. In Belarus, the programme targets the affected areas of the Brest, Gomel and Mogilev regions. In the Russian Federation, it supports initiatives in the Bryansk, Tula, Kaluga and Orel regions. In Ukraine, it focuses on the affected areas of the Chernihiv, Kyiv, Zhytomyr, Rivne and Volyn regions.

11. In 2010-2013, the implementing agencies of the Network produced numerous information materials for a variety of local stakeholders. The scientific board of the Network reviewed information packages and ensured that they were factually accurate, up to date, consistent and convincing. Training activities were conducted for teachers, medical professionals, community leaders and media representatives.

12. IAEA has put emphasis on elaborating and providing practical advice on questions related to radiation protection and food safety in the daily lives of the residents of the Chernobyl-affected areas. The information materials on radiological issues were developed for different target groups, including local authorities, teachers and the general population, in order to explain local radiological data and to provide background information. The materials were distributed across different channels, including a specifically developed Internet portal. Currently, the general public, local professionals and decision makers have access to official data on local radiological conditions, such as the contamination of affected territories by key radionuclides of Chernobyl origin (see www.chernobyl.info). The work has been conducted by leading national experts from Belarus, the Russian Federation and Ukraine. The information provided is well accepted by the local populations and the continuous availability of first-hand information contributes to both the reduction of exposures and to the build-up and maintenance of confidence in official information.

13. In 2010-2013, UNDP worked on opening 19 information and communications technology (ICT) centres in the remote and rural Chernobyl-affected communities of the three countries. Co-location of the ICT centres with local community centres, such as libraries or cultural and educational institutions, was viewed as the most appropriate option. Local authorities provided free space for the centres and contributed to repair work and other relevant expenditures through regular region/village budgets. In Belarus, the International Chernobyl Research and Information Network established a partnership with the leading national Internet provider "Beltelecom" to arrange free Internet access for local communities in the ICT centres. Workshops on the sustainability of the ICT centres were conducted in all three countries and training programmes on radiation safety were held for the staff of the centres.

14. UNDP also organized training programmes on healthy lifestyles, utilizing a peer-to-peer education approach. The training aimed to empower local stakeholders with information on how to live a healthier, more secure and prosperous life. As part of a larger endeavour with journalists, UNDP took the lead in organizing subregional trainings for media representatives from Belarus, the Russian

Federation and Ukraine. The events were supported by all four implementing agencies of the International Chernobyl Research and Information Network.

15. In addition to providing information support, community-based development was encouraged, through the implementation of small-scale initiatives, for example, on the water supply; diagnostics for thyroid cancer; the renovation of public facilities; and other activities aimed at reducing scepticism and on overcoming the "victim's syndrome".

16. The advisory committee of the International Chernobyl Research and Information Network, created under UNDP leadership, continued its work in 2010-2013. Set up to coordinate the activities of the project, it provided a "steering" mechanism for the implementing agencies and a platform to discuss and ensure the optimal transformation of activities into outputs, facilitating cooperation between relevant partners and stakeholders.

17. In Belarus, UNICEF succeeded in conducting an awareness-raising "Facts for life decade" campaign, with a focus on the basic facts that parents and other caregivers should know about the health and development of children. Experts from a number of institutions, such as the Belarusian State Medical University, Belarusian Medical Academy of Post-Graduate Studies, Republican Scientific and Practical Centre "Mother and Child", National Institute of Education, Gomel Regional Clinic Oncological Dispensary, Minsk City Centre of Hygiene and Epidemiology, Republican Scientific and Practical Centre of Traumatology and Orthopaedics, met with 431 adults and 122 children and young people in 10 affected locations in the Mogilev and Gomel regions, engaging in interactive lectures/discussions on the development of young children, child nutrition and physical development, iodine deficiency prevention, hygiene, trauma prevention, HIV and AIDS and the prevention of oncological diseases.

18. The second campaign and meetings held with local adult and young people were organized by the information centres on radiation safety that had been set up in the framework of the International Chernobyl Research and Information Network project.

19. Some 8,200 copies of the second edition of the Belarusian version of *Facts for Life* were disseminated among the information centres in 11 Chernobyl-affected locations and 21 cities in Belarus. Additional funding was raised for the publication by UNICEF, jointly with UNDP, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and the Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS.

20. A *Facts for Life* site was created and provides access to reliable, easily understandable information on child health and development.

21. WHO developed information packages on the effects on health of radiation and on following a healthy lifestyle, targeting specific groups, including primary health-care workers, teachers, local decision makers and the mass media. Using those information materials, WHO organized and participated in a number of tailor-made national workshops held in the affected areas of Belarus, the Russian Federation and Ukraine. The knowledge gained from the activities will enable participating specialists to effectively communicate with Chernobyl-affected populations, address their concerns and information needs and place radiation risks in the context of a broader spectrum of other health risks related to the environment and human behaviour. In addition, WHO organized two subregional workshops in

Kyiv: one in 2012, on the theme "Radiation and health: the lessons of Chernobyl", for local decision makers; and another in 2013, on the theme "Preparedness and response to environmental emergencies: the lessons of Chernobyl and Fukushima", for health specialists and emergency response workers from the three countries.

B. Community-based development

22. UNDP, UNICEF and the United Nations Population Fund implemented a joint project in Belarus in 2010-2013 that was aimed at enhancing human security in the Chernobyl-affected communities and was supported by the United Nations Trust Fund for Human Security. As a result of the initiative, the local population benefited from learning about new opportunities for income generation, minimizing radiation exposure and practicing healthy lifestyles. The local households increased their market profit by 5 to 20 per cent as a result of increased agricultural production and access to markets. The awareness of the local communities about safe and healthy living in the Chernobyl-affected territories increased, in particular through peer support groups for pregnant women, and new mothers and their families; screenings for breast cancer; and by educating health-care specialists.

23. The project supported the opening of 10 local radiation monitoring centres, which now provide the local population with accurate information on the Chernobyl legacy. Approximately 17,000 women were screened for breast cancer, and those identified as a "risk group" were offered a wider medical examination. Approximately 7,000 women were trained in breast self-examination techniques. Eleven self-support groups for pregnant women and new mothers were active in the target villages. A survey demonstrated that more than 90 per cent of the support group members had correctly identified elevated radiation exposure risks and the ways to minimize radiation exposure.

24. UNDP completed successful piloting of the area-based development approach in four Chernobyl-affected districts of Belarus. It supported the involvement of citizens in socioeconomic development at the local level, resulting in 61 community-based initiatives in the field of health care, energy efficiency and sports. Vulnerable groups, especially women and youth, acquired access to sustainable sources of employment and income-generation as well as capacity-building and market opportunities at the local level. The introduction of the area-based development approach unveiled broader opportunities for the introduction of a "local development agenda", including expansion of the approach to three more regions of Belarus.

25. In Ukraine, the area-based development approach to local development, piloted by UNDP in the Chernobyl-affected regions, became a national best practice. It provided a solid platform for remarkable expansion nationwide through the joint European Union/UNDP initiative to support community-led development in rural areas. Currently, the UNDP-led community-based initiatives contribute to the sustainable local development of all regions of Ukraine, including those affected by the Chernobyl accident. More than $30 million has already been invested to support 2,000 community initiatives in all 24 oblasts and the Autonomous Republic of Crimea. All Chernobyl-affected regions of Ukraine are receiving support for the implementation of local community-based initiatives. The communities are actively participating in the process and thus overcoming the "victim's syndrome" and

rebuilding community dignity. Local governments are mobilizing resources to provide matching funding for the programme.

26. In 2009-2012 UNDP also worked in Ukraine on an "Oxford volunteers for Chernobyl" scheme in cooperation with United Nations Volunteers (UNV), the Oxford University Ukrainian Society and the National University of Kyiv-Mohyla Academy. The goal of the programme was to provide knowledge resources and strengthen the developmental process in the Chernobyl-affected areas through international cooperation and volunteerism. Each year, some 10 international and national students participated in community-based activities. In 2011, UNV and UNDP teams in Ukraine, with the support of the United States Embassy in the country and two scholarships provided by the University of Toronto (Canada), hosted 12 students for three weeks of community-based activities in Kyiv and in Chernobyl-affected communities.

C. Subregional cooperation

27. The UNDP Office of United Nations Coordination of International Cooperation on Chernobyl has worked to strengthen subregional cooperation, in particular among UNDP Chernobyl teams in Belarus, the Russian Federation and Ukraine. It continued building synergies in three priority areas: information provision, policy advice and community development. Subregional annual conferences of UNDP Chernobyl teams were held in March 2011 and February 2012.

28. The replication of best practices between the areas that face developmental challenges similar to those of the Chernobyl-affected regions remains a priority of subregional cooperation. Territories around the former nuclear testing site of Semipalatinsk in Kazakhstan and uranium tailings in Central Asia face problems similar to those of the Chernobyl-affected areas, which are related to social exclusion, lack of opportunities, a low standard of living, especially in rural settlements, and the fear of radiation exposure. A number of knowledge management exchanges between the UNDP Chernobyl team and the relevant programmes in Central Asia took place in 2010-2013.

D. Policy advice

29. The recommendations developed during the previous reporting periods remain in effect. The Government of Belarus prioritized the sustainable socioeconomic development of the Chernobyl-affected areas over recovery measures, and UNDP will help to elaborate solutions for addressing the concrete socioeconomic needs of the affected communities. In Ukraine, UNDP is ready to support the Government in putting in place a legal framework that will allow local populations to resume economic activities and life in areas that will return to normalcy when and where the zoning system is abolished.

E. Infrastructure

30. In 2011-2013, the World Bank continued to provide assistance to Belarus, including through an additional loan of $30 million to scale up energy and gas

connection activities in the Chernobyl-affected areas. Energy efficiency measures are being implemented to address such immediate needs as the replacement of old and inefficient boilers and heat distribution systems; the installation of new windows and improved insulation; and the restoration of essential heat and hot water services in social institutions, namely, schools, hospitals and orphanages. Investments in residential gas connections are facilitating the provision of clean and improved space heating to households that had been burning wood, which has negative environmental and health consequences. The projects are being implemented in the Brest, Gomel and Mogilev regions of Belarus and benefit from the strong commitment and ownership of the national and local government.

31. As result of the project, about 250,000 students, teachers, patients, and medical staff have benefited from improved energy efficient services; 3,774 individual houses (about 10,000 beneficiaries) previously burning wood inside their homes have been connected to reliable gas heating; and 335 buildings have been rehabilitated, including with improved lighting in 224 of the buildings and the installation of new windows in 111. The reduction of carbon dioxide emissions attributed to heat and electricity generation is estimated to be 106,000 tons per year.

F. Health

32. The health consequences of the Chernobyl accident have been the main focus of the WHO Chernobyl programme since 1986.[1] In 2003-2005, WHO played a key role in the inter-agency Chernobyl Forum initiative and conducted a review and synthesis of the evidence in order to assess the health impact of the accident and provide health policy recommendations. The work resulted in the publication of the benchmark WHO report entitled *Health Effects of the Chernobyl Accident and Special Health Care Programmes: Report of the United Nations Chernobyl Forum Expert Group "Health"*, which was published in English in 2006[2] and in Russian in 2009.[3] The findings of the report were used as a basis for the development of training and information packages during the implementation of the International Chernobyl Research and Information Network project in 2009-2013.

33. The United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation is the body specifically mandated by the General Assembly to assess scientifically the levels and effects of exposure to sources of ionizing radiation. In 2008, in collaboration with scientists from Belarus, the Russian Federation and Ukraine, the Committee submitted a report to the Assembly on its most updated findings in respect of the health effects caused by irradiation from the accident (see A/63/46). The United Nations published the supporting scientific annexes in English in 2011[4] and in Russian in 2012, to facilitate dissemination to those most affected by the accident. The findings of the 2008 Committee report are in agreement with the 2006 WHO report.

34. Using information available to it in the intervening period since the accident, the 2008 report[4] reconfirmed that two workers had died in the immediate aftermath, and 134 plant staff and emergency personnel had suffered acute radiation syndrome,

[1] See http://www.who.int/ionizing_radiation/chernobyl/en/.

[2] See http://whqlibdoc.who.int/publications/2006/9241594179_eng.pdf.

[3] See http://whqlibdoc.who.int/publications/2009/9789244594179_rus.pdf.

[4] Available from http://www.unscear.org/docs/reports/2008/11-80076_Report_2008_Annex_D.pdf.

which had proved fatal for 28 of them. Several hundred thousand workers had subsequently been involved in recovery operations. Among those exposed to the highest radiation doses in 1986 and 1987, there had been some reports of increased incidence of leukaemia and of cataracts, but there was no other consistent evidence of other radiation-related health effects. Substantial deposits of radioactive material had led to serious social and economic disruption to large segments of the population in Belarus, the Russian Federation and Ukraine. Among the people who were children or adolescents in 1986 in those countries, more than 6,000 cases of thyroid cancer had been reported by 2006, of which a substantial portion could be attributed to drinking milk contaminated with the short-lived radionuclide iodine-131.[5] Relatively few cases had proved fatal by 2005. In the longer term, the general population was also exposed chronically to low levels of radiation, but there had been no consistent evidence of any other radiation-related health effects in the general population.

35. As part of its ongoing work, the Committee will continue to evaluate relevant information to provide a scientific basis for better understanding of the effects of radiation on health.

36. In 2010, the WHO International Agency for Research on Cancer completed the European Commission-funded project Agenda for Research on Chernobyl Health, the objective of which was to develop a strategic agenda for future health-related Chernobyl research. The project was undertaken by a multidisciplinary group of Chernobyl experts on the health consequences of the accident. The group identified and prioritized potential studies, assessed their feasibility, cost-effectiveness and likelihood of success, and provided a comprehensive strategic agenda for future research.

37. In 2012, as the next step towards implementing the project recommendations, the International Agency for Research on Cancer submitted to the European Commission, under the seventh Framework Programme of the European Atomic Energy Community, a proposal for funding of cooperation on Chernobyl health research. The initiative, which will be launched in November 2013, emphasizes the need to build partnerships with the three affected countries as well as with Japan, the United States of America and European countries, in order to take the Chernobyl health research agenda forward. The goal is to bring together both key scientific players and funding partners. The aim of the initiative is to set up a coordinating mechanism and to test potential infrastructures for conducting studies on health risks following the Chernobyl accident.

38. The International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, together with its member national societies in the three countries, continued to implement its Chernobyl Humanitarian Assistance and Rehabilitation Programme, ensuring the detection of thyroid gland cancer and other thyroid pathologies and addressing the basic health needs of the affected population. It is the longest individual humanitarian assistance programme in the history of the Federation, implemented over a period of 22 years. Although the three Red Cross national societies, with the support of the Federation, have been trying to secure funding from international donors to continue the project, by the end of 2012 the efforts

[5] To some degree, intensive screening would also have increased the rate of detection and hence the reporting of cases that might not have been caused by radiation exposure and that otherwise would not have been observed.

concentrated on finding alternative domestic funding sources and further integration of services with national programmes.

39. An estimated 4.2 million people have benefited from this long-lasting initiative. In particular, in 1990-1993, 561,000 beneficiaries received information on the background radiation surface contamination of objects; in 1992-1997, 401,000 people received health checks; in 1994-2012, 721,000 obtained multivitamins for children; in 1997-2012, 190,000 benefited from direct psychosocial support; and in 1997-2012, 1,605,000 received thyroid gland screening. Half of the latter had their thyroids screened for the first time in their lives; 171,000 were diagnosed with thyroid pathologies and referred for further treatment. Thyroid screening was undertaken by six mobile units that operated in the three countries most affected by the Chernobyl accident.

40. Since 2009, UNDP has been working in Belarus on the establishment of the International Scientific and Practical Centre of Thyroid Disease and has provided assistance in the elaboration and implementation of up-to-date methods and technologies, including for screenings and the treatment and rehabilitation of patients with thyroid cancer. The screenings were extended to 1,500 residents of the contaminated areas. As a result of the initiative, the relevant data has been added to the database on thyroid disease; a biological tissue bank has been established; and research has been conducted on iodine deficiency.

41. UNICEF activities in the area of health and the promotion of healthy lifestyles are described in sections A and B above.

G. Radiation mitigation and standard setting

42. In 2010-2013, IAEA provided radiological support for the rehabilitation of the affected areas and the enhancement of national capacities to control public exposure; assistance in the remediation of the affected territories using environmentally sound and cost-effective technologies; and assistance in improving safety at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant site and in radioactive waste management. IAEA continues to cooperate with other United Nations organizations on a range of activities that focus on mitigating the health, environmental and socioeconomic consequences of the accident.

43. IAEA also continued its implementation of two regional projects aimed at enhancing the radiation safety of the population and at promoting the socioeconomic rehabilitation of the Chernobyl-affected areas. The ongoing work aims to provide technical, scientific and information support for the gradual transition of the affected territories to normal radiological environmental conditions and to facilitate unrestricted economic activities. In 2010, IAEA organized an international workshop on the modern experience in the remediation of the areas affected by the Chernobyl accident in the Gomel region of Belarus. The workshop stressed the importance of applying modern remediation strategies to affected areas to help them to return to normalcy.

44. IAEA continues to support Belarus in improving the effectiveness of radiotherapy services for oncological patients. A modern single-mode linear accelerator was installed and put into operation in the Gomel regional oncological dispensary.

45. The projects IAEA is undertaking in Belarus and Ukraine at the national level and one at the regional level, as part of its 2012-2013 technical cooperation programme, amount to around 2 million euros (€). A similar level of IAEA support for the mitigation of the consequences of the Chernobyl accident is foreseen for its 2014-2015 technical cooperation programme.

H. Reactor safety and nuclear waste management

46. The Chernobyl accident spurred large-scale cooperation to support Ukraine in building a new shelter around the damaged reactor. The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) manages a project to support the decommissioning of units 1 to 3 of Chernobyl nuclear power plant and another to convert unit 4 and the old shelter around it into a safe state. Forty-five donors and EBRD have so far mobilized more than €2 billion for the implementation of the two programmes.

47. As part of the support provided for decommissioning the plant, EBRD has managed funds to finance the construction of a liquid radwaste treatment facility, scheduled to become operational in 2013. The same funds also finance the completion of a storage facility for spent fuel assemblies. From the point of view of nuclear safety, this is a key priority for the site, which reached an important milestone by receiving approval of the safety analysis report from the Ukrainian nuclear regulator in 2013.

48. The shelter implementation plan to transform Chernobyl unit 4 into a safe condition, also recently reached a crucial milestone, when Ukrainian authorities granted approval for the design of the new safe confinement. The project has made significant progress on the ground. A clean concrete layer has been laid in the new safe confinement assembly area with its large lifting towers, and access to the zone has been simplified, making the deployment of the hundreds of people working there much more efficient. The first segment has been assembled and was lifted to a height of 22 metres in November 2012; the second lift took it to a height of 55 metres in June 2013, as scheduled. Four more lifts and the installation of equipment for future deconstruction work remain to be carried out before the new safe confinement can slide into place to cover the destroyed unit.

49. Maintaining schedules and budgets for these complex projects remains an ongoing challenge for EBRD. The Bank insists on high standards in respect of radiation protection and the health and safety of workers in the Chernobyl projects and is satisfied with the good record achieved in that regard.

50. In line with the Chernobyl Forum recommendations, IAEA continues to support Ukraine in planning the decommissioning of the Chernobyl nuclear power plant and in improving radioactive waste management. It also continues to provide specific assistance in developing the decommissioning plan for the nuclear power plant cooling pond and in assessing its impact on ecological safety.

I. Environmental security

51. As part of the Environment and Security Initiative,[6] in January 2013 the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) commenced a project on the assessment of environmental risks in the exclusion zone along the Ukrainian and Belarusian borders. It aims to identify and map environmental risks on the Belarusian-Ukrainian border in the Chernobyl exclusion zone and to develop a sanitary regulation for operations there. On 6 March 2013, at the first coordination meeting held for the project, the decision was made to undertake field research, data analysis, mapping and elaboration of relevant recommendations.

52. The project activities will focus on assessing gamma radiation, the radioactive contamination of the soil by caesium-137 and americium-241 and of the air by caesium-137, strontium-90, isotopes of plutonium, and americium-241, the development of maps of minimum effective dose and contamination by the aforementioned radionuclides, and the elaboration of the recommendations for safe implementation of demarcation work (in Belarus) and border guard duty (in Belarus and Ukraine) in the exclusion zone. The project is planned for completion by the end of 2014.

53. Another new initiative by the Global Environment Facility of UNEP will aim to expand current use of the Chernobyl exclusion zone, in order to encompass ecosystem values and provide ecosystem services to the benefit of local, national and international stakeholders. The project activities will include establishment of a protected area network in and around the zone in order to maintain carbon stocks in forest and non-forest lands, in wetlands and in other habitats within the zone. Active involvement and ownership by national stakeholders will ensure the mainstreaming of project results. Effective communication channels between governmental ministries, agencies and departments, scientists and residents around the zone will be established.

54. The Global Environment Facility project will also include the creation of a research and environmental protection centre that will collect and synthesize existing research, undertake a gap analysis and become the repository for existing and future research. Participation of international scientific organizations in the project activities will facilitate the effective scale-up and replication of experiences.

55. In Ukraine, UNDP is working in the Chernobyl-affected areas of the Rivne, Zhytomyr and Kyiv oblasts to mainstream environmental issues into local policies and practice. Funded by the Government of Poland, the initiative is aimed at improving the strategic planning and decision-making capacity of local authorities to deal with environmental issues and manage available environmental assets. During 2012, environmental assessments of four affected territories were prepared and used for compiling local environmental strategic plans. An environmental forum for the Chernobyl-affected regions has been established to support environmental

[6] The Initiative was established in 2003 by UNEP, UNDP and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization became an associate member of the Initiative in 2004, through its Public Diplomacy Division. From 2006, the Economic Commission for Europe and the Regional Environment Center for Central and Eastern Europe joined the Initiative. The Initiative seeks to facilitate a process within which key public decision makers in South Eastern and Eastern Europe, Central Asia and the Caucasus can motivate action to advance and protect both peace and the environment at the same time.

considerations, planning and management, educational activities, communication and public engagement in those areas.

IV. Advocacy, information and public awareness

A. Anniversary commemorations

56. Anniversaries of the Chernobyl accident offer an opportunity to remind the world of the problems that the affected region continues to face and to promote potential solutions.

57. The twenty-fifth anniversary of the Chernobyl accident was marked by the visit of the Secretary-General to the site of the Chernobyl nuclear power plant and an international conference on the theme "Twenty-five years after the Chernobyl Accident: safety for the future", which was held in Kyiv in April 2011. At United Nations Headquarters in New York, a special commemorative meeting was held by the General Assembly on 26 April 2011, and a photo exhibition was organized by the Permanent Missions to the United Nations of Belarus, the Russian Federation and Ukraine, jointly with UNDP.

58. Statements attributable to the Spokesman for the Secretary-General, released on the twenty-fifth, twenty-sixth and twenty-seventh anniversaries of the Chernobyl disaster and widely circulated in English and Russian, addressed the huge impact of the accident on the region, while also expressing confidence that the communities affected by the accident increasingly have the means to lead normal lives. The Secretary-General called upon the international community to continue to support the recovery of the Chernobyl-affected areas.

B. Goodwill Ambassador

59. In February 2007, tennis star Maria Sharapova became a UNDP Goodwill Ambassador. Ms. Sharapova partnered with the Office of United Nations Coordination of International Cooperation on Chernobyl in delivering the message of hope to the Chernobyl-affected communities, particularly to youth. Since September 2008, UNDP and the Maria Sharapova Foundation have been partnering on a scholarship programme that supports gifted and talented youth from the Chernobyl-affected areas of Belarus.

60. A new project aimed at sports recovery in the Chernobyl-affected areas of Belarus and the Russian Federation was initiated in 2012. With support from the Maria Sharapova Foundation, opportunities will be given to local youth to practice lawn tennis, athletics and other sports, thus developing their talents and capabilities.

61. On the occasion of the twenty-fifth anniversary of the Chernobyl accident, Ms. Sharapova released an inspirational video message for youth from the Chernobyl-affected communities.

62. In 2011-2013, special attention was paid by the UNDP office in Belarus to the role of rural women in Chernobyl recovery efforts. Celebration of the International Day of Rural Women in Minsk involved the participation of State entities, non-governmental organizations, prominent rural women and the screening of a

documentary about the efforts of Chernobyl-affected communities aimed at recovery and development.

V. Lessons learned and knowledge management

63. In 2010-2013, IAEA prepared a wide range of documents, including on a remediation strategy for rural areas affected by the Chernobyl accident; on recommendations on radiation protection for the public, remediation and the return to economic use of the areas of Belarus, the Russian Federation and Ukraine subjected to contamination following the accident at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant in 1986 (2012); and an electronic register of the territories contaminated after the disaster at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant (2012). The documents represent an important step in harmonizing relevant national concepts and ensuring sustainable knowledge management.

64. IAEA also developed tools to aid decision-making for the evaluation of remediation strategies in the affected countries, including an update and extension of harmonized national monitoring databases intended for such purposes. Based on that data, and with help of the IAEA decision support tool on remediation strategies after the Chernobyl accident, recommendations on remediation strategies were developed and presented to the competent authorities of Belarus, the Russian Federation and Ukraine. As a result, the technical capabilities of the Member States for remediation planning were enhanced.

65. In 2012, IAEA published *Guidelines for Remediation Strategies to Reduce the Radiological Consequences of Environmental Contamination*. It targets individuals and authorities who deal with remediation projects or planning remediation strategies and includes an overview of the current state of knowledge on remediation planning for stakeholders at different levels of decision-making.

66. IAEA also supported the publication of new national guidelines on the application of ecologically sound remediation technology and on the optimized use of forest resources in Belarus and the Russian Federation.

67. WHO has developed a training toolkit in Russian for primary health-care sector workers to assist in providing information to concerned populations, young parents and patients, among others on the health risks of radiation. In addition, WHO has produced an information brochure, available in Russian, describing the experience gained through implementation of the International Chernobyl Research and Information Network project.[7]

68. In March 2013, the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs released a study on linking humanitarian and nuclear response systems. The study was produced at the request of the Secretary-General in the aftermath of the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant accident. The report draws upon the review of existing arrangements for international coordination of the response to nuclear emergencies and the roles and experiences of relevant organizations of the United Nations system in responding to radiological and nuclear emergencies. The report highlighted the extensive experience of UNDP in assisting affected countries with recovery in the aftermath of the Chernobyl accident. One of the recommendations

[7] http://chernobyl.info/Portals/0/Docs/ru/pdf_ru/publication%20WHO_ICRIN_S.pdf.

contained in the study was for UNDP to join the Inter-Agency Committee on Radiological and Nuclear Emergencies and to ensure that the human dimension of nuclear accidents is taken into consideration in early recovery efforts.

69. A number of lessons have been learned by UNDP on the developmental challenges that emerge in the aftermath of nuclear disaster and the recovery efforts that are specific to nuclear fallout. Chernobyl recovery work has provided an unprecedented experience in ways to tackle the human consequences of nuclear emergencies. Over the years of project implementation, UNDP has identified and tested solutions that work on the ground and can be replicated in other nuclear disaster situations. In 2013, UNDP launched a knowledge initiative to codify those experiences and produced a study entitled "Recovery from Chernobyl and other nuclear emergencies: experiences and lessons learned". The initiative was conducted in the framework of the United Nations action plan on Chernobyl to 2016.

Other initiatives

70. In the aftermath of the accident at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant in April 2011, the Secretary-General commissioned a United Nations system-wide study on the implications of the accident at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant (SG/HLM/2011/1). The report was released in September 2011 and contained a number of references to the consequences of the Chernobyl accident, such as food contamination, the effects on biota, anxiety in the general population and the lack of economic opportunities and information on the consequences of the disaster. In looking to the future, the Secretary-General acknowledged the need to focus on the link between the nuclear response system and the humanitarian coordination systems.

VI. Conclusions and recommendations

71. The United Nations has long played a crucial role in addressing the challenges faced by the Chernobyl-affected territories, initially in the immediate relief efforts following the accident and now in the focus on recovery.

72. The United Nations system and Governments have agreed to address the lingering consequences of the Chernobyl accident by supporting the affected communities in their return to normalcy and by fostering the region's long-term development. In the second half of the Decade of Recovery and Sustainable Development of the Affected Regions (2006-2016), the United Nations will continue to address the pending needs of the Chernobyl-affected communities. Effort will be made to initiate at least one more multi-agency subregional programme with a focus on environmental recovery, namely, on disaster preparedness in respect of the forest and peatland fires in Chernobyl-affected areas, on building the resilience of communities and on linking those activities to the sustainable development agenda.

73. United Nations country teams will make a continuous effort to keep the issues of post-Chernobyl recovery high on the inter-agency and international agendas. Coordination and cooperation among the organizations and bodies of the United Nations system should be guided by the developmental approach to Chernobyl, the United Nations action plan on Chernobyl to 2016 and the goal of enabling the Chernobyl-affected communities to lead normal lives. Subregional cooperation

should be continued, and synergies obtained from knowledge-sharing and best practices replication. One of the major challenges that lie ahead is the mobilization of more donor resources to support the local initiatives, helping the most vulnerable and ensuring the long-term sustainable development of the Chernobyl-affected territories.

74. The nuclear accident at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear plant once again highlighted the importance of the issue of sustainable development prospects in areas with a nuclear legacy. The experience gained by UNDP in Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent States region in tackling the human consequences in the Chernobyl-affected regions, in communities affected by nuclear tests in Semipalatinsk (Kazakhstan) and by the uranium tailings remediation projects in Central Asia has become increasingly relevant. Some of the challenges are unique to the nuclear emergencies, and their human consequences can be deep rooted and long-lasting. They include, in particular, stigma and fear, leading to a "victim mentality" and a culture of dependency in the affected areas.

75. The implementation of UNDP recovery and development projects also revealed some distinct features of tailor-made programming, which are different from those of other types of disasters. The needs of individuals and communities are best addressed if programmes provide up-to-date, accurate information to local people on the risks and impact of the disaster as well as psychological support to ease fears, anxiety, helplessness and feelings of abandonment. Forward-looking community-based projects should promote a spirit of activism and assist in the restoration of self-reliance and self. The effectiveness of coordination mechanisms among the organizations of the United Nations system involved in recovery efforts, according to their distinct mandates, is also critical for the success of those efforts.

76. These programmatic developmental approaches that address the unique human dimensions of nuclear disasters may serve as a guide in dealing with similar emergencies in the future. By the end of the third decade following the Chernobyl accident, it would be important to properly document and codify the solutions so that they can be applied and replicated in other nuclear disaster situations worldwide. UNDP is committed to putting into good use this experience. In order to apply the important lessons learned in other nuclear disaster situations worldwide, UNDP will be joining the platform of the Inter-Agency Committee on Radiological and Nuclear Emergencies. Other opportunities for institutionalizing the experience of UNDP in disaster risk reduction, preparedness, response and recovery will be explored.

77. The thirtieth anniversary of the Chernobyl nuclear accident coincides with the completion of the United Nations action plan on Chernobyl to 2016. This may provide the opportunity to reflect upon the results achieved and complete the institutionalization of the experiences in tackling the human consequences of nuclear disaster. UNDP, in its role as lead agency for United Nations activities on Chernobyl, is committed to giving a stronger voice to the human dimension of preparedness and recovery from nuclear emergencies at United Nations level and to incorporating that knowledge and experience into UNDP developmental programming worldwide.

78. In the remaining years of the United Nations action plan on Chernobyl to 2016, UNDP is prepared to lead the dialogue with organizations of the United Nations system and Member States on the future of inter-agency cooperation in respect of the human consequences of the Chernobyl accident and other man-made disasters.

Annex I

Report of Belarus

[Original: Russian]

Addressing the impact of the Chernobyl disaster is a matter of national significance for the Republic of Belarus. Half of the country's 118 districts were affected, 21 of which are still experiencing severe effects. All of the relevant hands-on work is carried out under national programmes to address the impact of the disaster at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant. Programme funding represents a significant portion of the national budget.

Between 1991 and 2010, four government Chernobyl programmes were carried out, at a cost of some $19.4 billion.

In 2011, the country started moving to a new phase in addressing the problems arising from the disaster, a central aspect of which is to restore and develop the affected areas. The fifth national programme is now under way and will continue through 2015. Its objectives are to continue reducing the risk of adverse health impacts and shift from restoration of the area to sustainable socioeconomic development thereof, while ensuring that radiation safety requirements are fully met.

It is unlawful in the Republic of Belarus to engage in industrial production or sale of any items containing radionuclides in excess of safe levels.

Since 1 million hectares of land contaminated with radionuclides are under agricultural production, special protective activities include shipping phosphorus and potash fertilizers to the contaminated areas and introducing them into the soil, liming acidic soil, cultivating hay and grazing lands, and providing mixed, cesium-absorbent feed.

Protective measures for agriculture and special measures in the area of forestry ensure that industry requirements for purity of output are met. These activities will remain necessary in future.

There is an effective radiation monitoring system for food products, food commodities, agricultural raw materials and forest products from areas with radionuclide contamination. There are more than 830 radiation monitoring offices in operation and over 2,000 radiometric and spectrometry devices in use. Accordingly, there have in recent years been no recorded cases of food products with radionuclide content above allowed levels finding their way into the retail network.

Issues related to the health of the afflicted population, disaster response workers and especially children who live in areas contaminated with radionuclides are central to national policy. The State-funded medical system for monitoring, prophylactic exams, diagnostics, disease treatment, wellness and sanatorium and health resort treatment compensates to some extent for the public health damage wrought by the Chernobyl disaster.

More than 1,500,000 disaster victims are under medical observation, including some 270,000 children. There is a national register of persons affected by radioactivity as a result of the Chernobyl disaster.

Children living in the affected areas receive group treatments and wellness care at sanatoria and health resorts. There is now a network of paediatric rehabilitation and wellness centres that welcome groups of children year round.

Children who are enrolled in schools in the areas with radioactive contamination (118,000 people) receive hot meals free of charge.

Improved medical care and a large-scale sanatorium, health resort and wellness programme have done much to hold down the occurrence of disease in the affected population, particularly among children.

The main national policy to address the impact of the Chernobyl disaster in the near term involves growing the social and economic potential of the affected regions, restoring living conditions and developing the afflicted areas effectively and systematically by harmonizing social protection measures and redirecting resources for economic and social development in the regions.

The contaminated areas cannot be sustainably developed without State support and contributions from international partners to improve rural residents' individual garden plots, develop self-employment and social infrastructure in the afflicted regions, boost residents' economic activity and adaptability to market conditions, raise income and reduce dependence on State social assistance.

Strategic objectives for the current period through 2020 include the following:

- Radiation and environmental rehabilitation and sustainable socioeconomic development of the contaminated areas through effective regional business planning, regional development and special projects.
- Increased radiological and environmental awareness and incentives to develop active members of the community, impart practical radiological and environmental knowledge and actively involve the community in improving living conditions.
- Systematic information support during restoration of the afflicted regions, and regional public image enhancement.
- A shift from special events and one-time projects to systematic work across the afflicted areas.
- Preservation of the cultural heritage of the affected areas and commemoration of the disaster.

Establishing a welcoming climate for foreign investments; introducing innovative social policy in the contaminated regions; and fostering economic development of the regions, small and medium enterprises, self-employment and job creation all remain relevant to current needs.

The primary objectives of restoration — genuine economic rebirth and sustainable development — will be based on reviving the afflicted districts' economic potential, adopting up-to-date industrial methods in agribusiness and forestry and improving the well-being of the people in the area.

The Republic of Belarus notes that the assistance of United Nations system organizations in restoring social infrastructure in the afflicted regions is of particular importance.

Annex II

Report of Ukraine

[Original: Russian]

International cooperation on issues of health care, social protection and radiation protection, including drawing on relevant international lessons learned, is a national policy priority for Ukraine in responding to the impact of the Chernobyl disaster.

From 2011 to 2013, the State Exclusion Zone Management Agency of Ukraine implemented government policy to eliminate or mitigate the impact of the Chernobyl disaster, including in the specific areas listed below:

- Addressing the medical, environmental and socioeconomic impact of the Chernobyl disaster.
- Support for environmental safety in the exclusion zone, including the zone's barrier function.
- Handling of radioactive wastes, depleted nuclear fuel and ionizing radiation sources; decommissioning of the Chernobyl nuclear power plant units; conversion of the Shelter facility into an environmentally safe system; and rehabilitation of lands contaminated by radiation.
- Physical protection of nuclear facilities and materials, radioactive wastes and other ionizing radiation sources at enterprises, institutions and organizations for which the State Exclusion Zone Management Agency is responsible.

The Government of Ukraine has for many years been successfully engaged with United Nations agencies on issues related to the medical, environmental and socioeconomic impact of the Chernobyl disaster. Fostering the rebirth and development of the afflicted areas is the primary objective of all of the relevant international projects. An International Chernobyl Research and Information Network project conducted in 2011 and 2012 included activities designed to encourage healthy lifestyles and help local communities return to normal.

A project to integrate environmental protection into the local development strategy for areas afflicted by the Chernobyl disaster was begun in 2012 in the towns of Korosten, Zhytomyr oblast; Rokitne, Rivne oblast; and Bohuslav, Kyiv oblast. These three oblasts were contaminated as a result of the disaster. The project incorporated environmental factors into regional-level strategic development planning for the afflicted areas. It included a Chernobyl environmental forum, whose purpose was to present contemporary approaches and shape environmental awareness; support effective environmental preservation planning and management; and increase public awareness and involvement in actions that directly protect the environment, to achieve consistent development in the afflicted areas.

A socioeconomic development project targeting districts in Rovensk oblast that were contaminated as a result of the Chernobyl disaster was completed in 2012. The project was designed to support local government efforts to improve living conditions and the economic and psychological condition of those living in areas contaminated by radiation. The project was carried out in 14 communities in the district of Vladimirets.

Given the long-term nature of the disaster's impact and the findings presented at the international conference held to mark the twenty-fifth anniversary of the Chernobyl disaster and consider safety issues for the future, the Government of Ukraine believes that cooperation with the United Nations and other international organizations to address the medical, environmental and socioeconomic impact of the Chernobyl disaster must continue.

To reduce the impact of the disaster, a safety assessment was done at the Buryakovka radioactive waste storage site. This was carried out under the annual European Commission action programme (Nuclear Safety Cooperation Instrument), as part of two international technical assistance projects to improve infrastructure for handling radioactive waste in the Chernobyl exclusion zone. A technical and economic assessment of the structure and design of the rail line linking existing and future radioactive waste storage and disposal facilities located in the Chernobyl exclusion zone (including the Chernobyl nuclear power plant site) to the national rail system was done to ensure and improve radioactive waste transportation safety.

A primary aspect of the radiation hazard that the exclusion zone presents to the areas bordering it is the movement of radionuclides by means of water, air (carried by wind) and biological and artificial (man-made) pathways. Since the vast expanses of forest in the exclusion zone provide effective protection against the aerial movement of radionuclides, work is being done to protect and manage the forests, including measures to prevent forest fires and revitalize, restore and cultivate the forest. These activities have warded off major forest fires during the period from 2011 to 2013 and reduced aerial movement of radionuclides from the exclusion zone.

Nine temporary radioactive waste containment sites and three radioactive waste disposal sites were set up in the exclusion area in 1986 and 1987 in the aftermath of the Chernobyl disaster. These sites are being monitored. The total volume of radioactive wastes that have accumulated (including equipment, structures and waste now at temporary disposal sites), not counting the Shelter facility, is some 2.8 million cubic metres. Vektor, an industrial facility for deactivating, transporting, processing and disposing of radioactive waste, is being built to address future processing and disposal issues. Construction of the start-up complex of phase I of the Vektor facility, consisting of 25 infrastructure components, is now complete, and operations have begun. In addition, the German company Nukem has built and opened at the Vektor site a specially equipped surface-level solid radioactive waste storage facility to dispose of radioactive waste that formed as the Chernobyl plant was being decommissioned. Future activity at the Vektor complex will include the launch of its second phase, as a centre for processing and disposal of radioactive wastes from Ukraine. Radioactive waste processing capacity (incineration, compaction, encapsulation and containerization) will be developed, and there will be long-term (50- to 100-year) surface storage facilities for long-life and highly active wastes. Under Vektor's first and second phases, a total of 26 disposal and long-term storage facilities for radioactive waste and six special processing installations will be designed and built by 2017.

Construction of the new safe confinement over the Shelter facility is now in its final phase. Plans for the new safe confinement infrastructure are complete. The challenging task of stabilizing the unstable structures and the existing sarcophagus over the damaged reactor by means of the Shelter facility has been successfully concluded.

The stabilization work will enable the most essential structures to remain operational until 2023. Thanks to the subcontractor, a consortium of European companies, work on the new safe confinement is on schedule and moving full speed ahead. The new safe confinement will eventually cover the entire Shelter facility and provide the conditions and technical resources needed so that work to safely dismantle the existing facility and extract highly active radioactive wastes and materials containing nuclear fuel from the destroyed fourth unit can continue for at least 100 years.

The method involving assembly of the new safe confinement at a special construction site, followed by installation in one piece over the Shelter facility, rather than phased on-site assembly, has been approved. That will significantly reduce worker exposure to radiation.

Costs and timelines for erecting the vaulted new safe confinement are being regularly monitored and specified as the work goes forward. The cost of building the new safe confinement now stands at some 935 million euros. There is currently reason to believe that the work will be fully finished by late 2015, with the total project cost coming in at upwards of a billion euros.

Initial work to decommission the Chernobyl nuclear power plant and convert the Shelter facility into an environmentally safe system was done between 2008 and 2012. Safe maintenance of units Nos. 1, 2 and 3, spent nuclear fuel storage facility No. 1 and the Shelter facility and physical protection of the nuclear materials at the Chernobyl industrial facility are all provided for, as is compliance with the relevant non-proliferation safeguards. Preparations are under way for the national programme for the upcoming period, through 2017. The programme is now awaiting approval by the executive agencies. It is essential that these activities be enacted into national law without delay so that the work does not lose momentum and also to guarantee funding from the national budget to decommission units Nos. 1, 2 and 3 and provide safe maintenance during the conversion of the Shelter facility.

The matter of extracting the remains of unit No. 4 from the Shelter facility and disposing of them in accordance with the regulations for long-life radioactive waste is a crucial one that must be resolved. Before transition to the phase of removing the fuel-containing materials from the shelter, equipment must be developed for conditioning the fuel-containing materials, which are lying out in the open, and for extracting them from the facility. Finding a solution to these unique tasks will require continued mobilization of donor nation resources in order to ward off the danger facing the entire planet.

Donor nations are aware that the conversion of the Shelter facility is not fully funded, and that funding is lacking for some aspects of the work to dismantle unstable structures, extract the fuel-containing materials and convert them to make them safe. In the near future, the utmost must be done to galvanize the additional resources required for completion of this work.

Completion of the projects to address the international issue of converting the Shelter facility into a safe system will satisfy the international community's commitment to shut down operations of the three Chernobyl units ahead of schedule. It will fulfil international agreements to decommission the Chernobyl plant and convert the Shelter facility into an environmentally safe system.

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Security Council
Sixty-eighth year

Identical letters dated 30 September 2013 from the Permanent Representative of Lebanon to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

On instructions from my Government, I transmit herewith a statistical summary of Israeli violations of Security Council resolution 1701 (2006) committed in August 2013 (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would circulate the present letter as an official document of the sixty-eighth session of the General Assembly, under agenda item 35, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Nawaf **Salam**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

13-50148 (E) 081013 091013

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Annex to the identical letters dated 30 September 2013 from the Permanent Representative of Lebanon to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

Land violations

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
4 August 2013	0001	An Israeli enemy patrol comprising a Hummer and a Land Rover vehicle stopped opposite a Lebanese Army position, where seven soldiers stepped out and inspected the technical line. Curses in Arabic were heard. The patrol then left the area and returned into occupied territory at 0005 hours.
7 August 2013	0045	In the Labbunah border area, locality of Nimr al-Jamal, Israeli enemy soldiers violated the Blue Line by approximately 400 metres into Lebanese territory at coordinates Q: 663750-N:701400, at which two landmines exploded, resulting in several casualties. Light machine-gun fire was also heard. The soldiers then withdrew into occupied territory.
	1800	An Israeli enemy patrol comprising two Land Rover vehicles entered the Wazzani area, where four soldiers stepped out, opened the gate and crossed the technical fence by approximately 50 metres for five minutes. They then closed the gate and departed into occupied territory.
	2145	An Israeli enemy patrol comprising three Hummer vehicles proceeded from the Shaykh Abbad position and stopped near the technical fence opposite the Lebanese Army post for 10 minutes, from which it directed a light towards Lebanese territory before leaving the area.
	2310	An Israeli enemy patrol comprising two Humvee vehicles directed a searchlight towards the Lebanese Army position on the outskirts of the town of Alma al-Sha'b for approximately two minutes.
8 August 2013	0930	An Israeli enemy patrol comprising a Hummer vehicle moved into the Wazzani area where four soldiers stepped out, opened the gate and crossed the technical fence by approximately 15 metres for five minutes. The soldiers then returned, closed the gate and departed into occupied territory.
9 August 2013	1930	An Israeli enemy patrol comprising a Hummer vehicle moved into the Wazzani area where four soldiers stepped out, opened the gate and crossed the technical fence by about five metres for five minutes. The soldiers then returned, closed the gate and departed into occupied territory.

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
12 August 2013	1530	An Israeli enemy patrol comprising two Hummer vehicles moved from within occupied Palestinian territory into the area opposite point B82 at the crossing point at coordinates Q:738410-N:683700, where six soldiers stepped out for five minutes and hurled insults at the Lebanese Army soldiers at the observation point in that area.
13 August 2013	1140	An Israeli enemy patrol comprising two Land Rover vehicles, two Hummer vehicles and three Kaminkar vehicles moved into the Wazzani area, where 19 soldiers stepped out, opened the gate and crossed the technical fence onto the road that had recently been built. At 1415 hours the soldiers closed the gate and departed into occupied territory.
	2128	From its Zar'it barracks position, the Israeli enemy directed a searchlight into Lebanese territory, towards the Tarbikha gate and the nearby Lebanese Army position for approximately one minute.
14 August 2013	2015	From its Zar'it barracks position, the Israeli enemy directed a searchlight into Lebanese territory, towards the Tarbikha gate and the nearby Lebanese Army position for approximately one minute.
	2108	From its Zar'it barracks position, the Israeli enemy directed a searchlight into Lebanese territory towards the Tarbikha gate and the nearby Lebanese Army position for approximately one minute.
21 August 2013	0650	An Israeli enemy patrol comprising 20 soldiers moved into the Wazzani area where its soldiers opened the gate, crossed the technical fence and patrolled the area overlooking the Wazzani resort. They reached the gate opposite point OP8, where one of the enemy soldiers greeted an officer of the Lebanese Army patrol. At 1000 hours, the soldiers departed into occupied territory.
	1700	In the locality of Malikiyya, 24 Israeli enemy soldiers crossed the technical fence and violated the Blue Line opposite the town of Aytarun, between points B56 and BP25, before leaving the area and returning into occupied territory at 1737 hours.
23 August 2013	0400	The Israeli enemy fired a missile from the open sea in the direction of the Na'imah tunnels near the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine – General Command position inside Lebanese territory, resulting in a hole five metres wide and three metres deep. There were no casualties.
25 August 2013	1500	An Israeli enemy patrol attempted to abduct a civilian, Khudr Muhammad Nab'ah, who was grazing his flock near point OP4 on the outskirts of Habbariyah town, in the locality of Rus in Saddanah, within Lebanese territory. When he fled towards the town, the enemy patrol took 350 head of goats that belonged to him. At 2100 hours, the goats were returned to Lebanese territory.

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
27 August 2013	0500	Several explosions were heard within the occupied Shab'a Farms.
	0900	
29 August 2013	1400	In the locality of Jabal Shahl, on the outskirts of Shab'a town inside Lebanese territory, an Israeli enemy patrol attempted to abduct the Lebanese citizen Ali Qasim Zahra, who was grazing his flock. He succeeded in escaping along with the flock.
	2045	From its Kiryat Shemona position opposite the town of Kafr Killa, the Israeli enemy directed two searchlights towards Lebanese territory for five minutes.
31 August 2013	1930	From its Kiryat Shemona position opposite the town of Kafr Killa, the Israeli enemy directed two searchlights towards Lebanese territory for five minutes.
	2300	

Sea violations

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
10 August 2013	2123	From its position in Ra's Naqurah, the Israeli enemy directed a searchlight towards Lebanese territorial waters for one minute.

Air violations

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
1 August 2013	0800	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. It circled over the South before leaving at 1320 hours over Rumaysh.
	1205	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1400 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
4 August 2013	0930	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over Riyaq, Baalbek and Hirmil before leaving at 1700 hours over Rumaysh.
	1115	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. It circled over the South before leaving at 1830 hours over Rumaysh.
	1225	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1410 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
5 August 2013	0700	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. It circled over the South before leaving at 1830 hours over Naqurah.
6 August 2013	1220	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa and leaving at 1240 hours over the sea off Tripoli.
	1255	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over the sea off Tripoli. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1410 hours over the sea west of Naqurah.
7 August 2013	1015	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Aytarun. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1130 hours over Aytarun.
	1020	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. It circled over the South and the Western Bekaa before leaving at 1430 hours over Naqurah.
	1215	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1405 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	2055	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. It circled over the South before leaving at 0125 hours on 8 August over Rumaysh.
8 August 2013	1220	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1415 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
11 August 2013	0825	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over Riyaq, Baalbek and Hirmil before leaving at 1350 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	1135	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1340 hours over the sea west of Naqurah.
13 August 2013	0910	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over the South before leaving at 1340 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	0925	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. It circled over Riyaq, Jubb Jannin, Baalbek and Hirmil before leaving at 1915 hours over Kafr Killa.
	1035	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. They circled all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1220 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
14 August 2013	0640	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over the South, Beirut and its suburbs and then over the South before leaving at 1720 hours over Rumaysh.
	0750	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. It circled over the South, Riyaq and Baalbek before leaving at 1700 hours over Naqurah.
15 August 2013	0800	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. It circled over the South before leaving at 1255 hours over Naqurah.
	0800	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Aytarun. It circled over the South, Zahlah and the Western Bekaa before leaving at 1700 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	0805	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over the South and Beirut and its suburbs before leaving at 1510 hours over Yarun.
	0840	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over the sea off Naqurah. It circled over Beirut and its suburbs and as far as Batrun before leaving at 1455 hours over Rumaysh.
	0950	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over Iqlim al-Kharrub and the Shuf before leaving at 1410 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	1207	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1330 hours over the sea off Naqurah.
16 August 2013	0620	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. It circled over the South before leaving at 1940 hours over Naqurah.
17 August 2013	0600	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. It circled over the South before leaving at 1325 hours over the occupied Shab'a Farms.
	1400	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over the South before leaving at 1905 hours over the occupied Shab'a Farms.
18 August 2013	0845	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over the South before leaving at 1920 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
	0855	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over the South before leaving at 1710 hours over Aytarun.
	0945	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over the occupied Shab'a Farms. It circled over the South and Hasbayya before leaving at 1220 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	1045	Four Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1150 hours over Naqurah.
	1100	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Aytarun. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1250 hours over Aytarun.
19 August 2013	0850	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. It circled over the South and Iqlim al-Kharrub before leaving at 1750 hours over Naqurah.
	0850	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. It circled over the South, Iqlim al-Kharrub, Riyaq, Baalbek and Hirmil before leaving at 2110 hours over Rumaysh.
	0955	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over the South and Beirut and its suburbs before leaving at 0600 hours on 20 August over Rumaysh.
20 August 2013	0600	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. It circled over the South, Riyaq, Baalbek and the South once again before leaving at 1845 hours over Naqurah.
	0610	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over the South and Beirut before leaving at 0500 hours on 21 August over Rumaysh.
	0740	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over the South, Riyaq and Baalbek before leaving at 1900 hours over Rumaysh.
	1130	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over the Western Bekaa before leaving at 1200 hours over Kafr Killa.
21 August 2013	0600	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over Zahlah, Baalbek and Hirmil before leaving at 1615 hours over Naqurah.

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
	0640	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. It circled over the South, Riyaq, Baalbek and Hirmil before leaving at 0020 hours on 22 August over Kafr Killa.
	0800	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. It circled over Beirut, Riyaq, Baalbek and Hirmil before leaving at 2120 hours over Naqurah.
	1030	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1220 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	2345	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over the occupied Shab'a Farms. It circled over Riyaq, Baalbek and the South before leaving at 1030 hours on 22 August over Naqurah.
22 August 2013	0900	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over the South, Riyaq, Baalbek and Hirmil before leaving at 2210 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	0915	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over Beirut and its suburbs before leaving at 1420 hours over Aytarun.
	1000	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over the sea off Juniyah. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1315 hours over the sea off Naqurah.
	1015	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. It circled over the South before leaving at 1410 hours over Naqurah.
	1050	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah and heading north. It circled over the South before leaving at 1845 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	2240	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. It circled over the South, Riyaq and Baalbek before leaving at 1545 hours on 23 August over Rumaysh.
23 August 2013	0815	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over the South, Juniyah and Damur before leaving at 1200 hours over Naqurah.

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
	0900	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. It circled over the South, Baalbek and Riyaq before leaving at 1420 hours over Naqurah.
	1510	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. It circled over the South, Baalbek and Riyaq before leaving at 0430 hours on 24 August over Alma al-Sha'b.
	1835	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. It circled over the Western Bekaa and the South before leaving at 1940 hours over Rumaysh.
24 August 2013	0230	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. It circled over Riyaq and Baalbek before leaving at 1630 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	1500	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. It circled over Riyaq and Baalbek before leaving at 0815 hours on 25 August over Kafr Killa.
25 August 2013	0735	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. It circled over Riyaq and Baalbek before leaving at 2050 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	1045	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1240 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	1925	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over the South, the Western Bekaa, Riyaq and Baalbek before leaving at 0915 hours on 26 August over Alma al-Sha'b.
26 August 2013	0930	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. It circled over the South before leaving at 1705 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	1220	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Aytarun. They left at 1235 hours, heading in the direction of Turkey.
	1305	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over the sea off Shikka. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1405 hours over the sea off Naqurah.
	2045	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over the South, Baalbek and Riyaq before leaving at 1405 hours on 27 August over Naqurah.

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
27 August 2013	0740	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over Beirut and its suburbs and then circled over Riyaq and Baalbek before leaving at 2020 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	1200	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over Riyaq, Baalbek and Hirmil before leaving at 1745 hours over Rumaysh.
	1320	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Aytarun. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1510 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	1700	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. It circled over the South before leaving at 1850 hours over Kafr Killa.
	2235	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over Riyaq and Baalbek before leaving at 0335 hours on 28 August over Rumaysh.
28 August 2013	0645	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over the South, Riyaq, Baalbek, Hirmil and the South once again before leaving at 2215 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	0940	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over Beirut and its suburbs before leaving at 1225 hours over Rumaysh.
	1020	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa and leaving at 1035 hours over the sea to the west of Tripoli, heading in the direction of Turkey.
	1105	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over the sea to the west of Shikka. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1200 hours over Kafr Killa.
	1305	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. It circled over the South before leaving at 0715 hours on 29 August over Alma al-Sha'b.
	1650	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1835 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
29 August 2013	0125	Four Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 0300 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
	0630	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over the South before leaving at 1820 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	0700	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over Beirut and its suburbs before leaving at 1425 hours over Naqurah.
	1050	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1250 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	1145	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over Riyaq, Baalbek, Hirmil and the North before leaving at 1720 hours over Naqurah.
	1320	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over Riyaq, Baalbek Hirmil and the South before leaving at 2220 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	1340	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over the South before leaving at 0115 hours on 30 August over Naqurah.
	1710	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1855 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	2100	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over the occupied Shab'a Farms. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 2320 hours entering over the occupied Shab'a Farms.
	2340	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Aytarun. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 0235 hours on 30 August over Naqurah.
30 August 2013	0010	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over the South before leaving at 1105 hours over Naqurah.
	0235	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over the occupied Shab'a Farms. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 0600 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	0615	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. It circled over the South before leaving at 1850 hours over Naqurah.

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
	0620	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 0840 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	0955	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. It circled over the South before leaving at 2015 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	1050	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Aytarun. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1230 hours over Rumaysh.
	1100	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over the Shuf and the South before leaving at 1310 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	1110	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over the South before leaving at 1720 hours over the sea to the west of Naqurah.
	1335	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. It circled over the Western Bekaa before leaving at 1510 hours over Kafr Killa.
	1615	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1750 hours over Aytarun.
	1805	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over the South before leaving at 0655 hours on 31 August over Naqurah.
	1940	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. It circled over the South before leaving at 0725 hours on 31 August over Alma al-Sha'b.
	2200	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 0015 hours on 31 August over Rumaysh.
31 August 2013	0700	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. It circled over the South before leaving at 1700 hours over Rumaysh.
	0730	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. It circled over the South before leaving at 1540 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	1010	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. It circled over Akkar, Hirmil and Baalbek before leaving at 1530 hours over Kafr Killa.

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
	1050	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa and heading north. They left at 1105 hours to the west of Shikka, heading in the direction of Turkey.
	1125	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering to the west of Shikka. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1225 hours over Rumaysh.
	1140	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over Iqlim al Kharrub before leaving at 1555 hours over Kafr Killa.
	1200	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Aytarun. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1235 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	1200	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1245 hours over Kafr Killa.
	1425	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Aytarun. It circled over the South before leaving at 2310 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	1445	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. It circled over the South and Zahlah before leaving at 0020 hours on 1 September over Rumaysh.
	1610	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. It circled over the South and Zahlah before leaving at 0125 hours on 1 September over Alma al-Sha'b.
	1615	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1800 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	2235	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over the South before leaving at 0520 hours on 1 September over Rumaysh.
	2325	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering to the west of Shikka. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 0040 hours on 1 September over Alma al-Sha'b.
	2330	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 0115 hours on 1 September over Naqurah.

United Nations A/68/500

General Assembly

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Sixty-eighth session
Agenda item 108
Crime prevention and criminal justice

Letter dated 26 September 2013 from the Permanent Representative of Belarus to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit herewith, on behalf of the 22 United Nations Member States that constitute the Group of Friends United against Human Trafficking, Bahrain, Belarus, Bangladesh, Bolivia (Plurinational State of), Ecuador, Egypt, India, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, the Lao People's Democratic Republic, Libya, Nicaragua, Nigeria, the Philippines, Qatar, the Russian Federation, Singapore, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, the United Arab Emirates, Uzbekistan and Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of), the Declaration on the Global Efforts to Combat Trafficking in Persons, which was adopted at the Fourth Ministerial Meeting of the Group of Friends, convened on 26 September 2013 on the margins of the sixty-eighth session of the General Assembly (see annex).

It would be appreciated if you could have the present letter and the annex thereto circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 108.

(*Signed*) Andrei **Dapkiunas**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative of the
Republic of Belarus to the United Nations

13-49986 (E) 081013

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Annex to the letter dated 26 September 2013 from the Permanent Representative of Belarus to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Declaration on the Global Efforts to Combat Trafficking in Persons

We, the members of the Group of Friends United against Human Trafficking, the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of Bahrain, the People's Republic of Bangladesh, the Republic of Belarus, the Plurinational State of Bolivia, the Republic of Ecuador, the Arab Republic of Egypt, the Republic of India, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, the Lao People's Democratic Republic, Libya, Nicaragua, the Federal Republic of Nigeria, the Republic of the Philippines, the State of Qatar, the Russian Federation, the Republic of Singapore, the Republic of Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, the United Arab Emirates, the Republic of Uzbekistan and the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, having met on 26 September 2013 on the margins of the sixty-eighth session of the United Nations General Assembly, in New York,

1. Reaffirm the previous Declarations of the Group of Friends United against Human Trafficking, adopted at the ministerial meetings in 2010, 2011 and 2012;

2. Reaffirm the United Nations Global Plan of Action to Combat Trafficking in Persons, which, inter alia, committed to promoting comprehensive, coordinated and consistent responses at the national, regional and international levels to counter trafficking in persons, and also reaffirm our full adherence to its comprehensive implementation;

3. Welcome the outcome of the high-level meeting of the General Assembly held during its sixty-seventh session from 13 to 15 May 2013 to appraise the progress achieved in the implementation of the Global Plan of Action that, inter alia, evinced strong political will to step up efforts against trafficking in persons;

4. Invite the General Assembly to schedule the next appraisal of the implementation of the United Nations Global Plan of Action for its seventy-first session;

5. Express support for the activities of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) as coordinator of the Inter-Agency Coordination Group against Trafficking in Persons (ICAT);

6. Encourage UNODC and other ICAT members to strengthen, in line with their existing mandates, the implementation of the Global Plan of Action, and in this regard invite UNODC and other ICAT members, in cooperation with United Nations Member States, to elaborate and present in an appropriate manner to the General Assembly at its sixty-ninth session the list of concrete measures planned by ICAT until 2016 aimed at implementing the Global Plan of Action;

7. Recognize the importance of better international coordination and information exchanges on good practices to address the problem of trafficking in persons;

8. Welcome the outcome of the workshop on law enforcement aspects of combating human trafficking that took place on 29 and 30 May 2013 in Minsk (Belarus), and express the hope that the practice of holding such events will

continue, thus contributing positively to the implementation of the Global Plan of Action;

9. Reaffirm the importance of humanitarian, legal and financial aid to victims of trafficking in persons, including through the United Nations Voluntary Trust Fund for Victims of Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, established in compliance with the Global Plan of Action, and encourage United Nations Member States, the private sector, non-governmental organizations and individuals to continue to provide financial support to the Trust Fund;

10. Decide to convene the fifth ministerial meeting of the Group of Friends United against Human Trafficking on the margins of the seventieth session of the General Assembly.

New York, 26 September 2013

United Nations A/68/501–S/2013/589

General Assembly
Security Council

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General Assembly
Sixty-eighth session
Agenda items 34 and 38

Protracted conflicts in the GUAM area and their implications for international peace, security and development

The situation in the occupied territories of Azerbaijan

Security Council
Sixty-eighth year

Letter dated 3 October 2013 from the Permanent Representative of Azerbaijan to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

In accordance with instructions received from the Government of the Republic of Azerbaijan, I have the honour to draw your attention to ongoing violations of the ceasefire by the armed forces of the Republic of Armenia recorded for August 2013 (see annex). As is seen from the annexed information, during the reporting period, the armed forces of Armenia continued intensive fire from their positions in the occupied territories of Azerbaijan and from the territory of Armenia. As a result of fire from the territory of Armenia, one Azerbaijani civilian was wounded.

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda items 34 and 38, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Agshin **Mehdiyev**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

13-50041 (E) 111013

Please recycle

Annex to the letter dated 3 October 2013 from the Permanent Representative of Azerbaijan to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Violation of the ceasefire by the armed forces of the Republic of Armenia[a] for August 2013

No.	*Date*	*Time*	*Direction (locality)*	*Weapons used*	*Casualties and damages*
1.	1 August	0005-0010	Shirvanly and Chemenli villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
2.		0005-0030	Jerabert and Karmiravan villages (Tartar district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type and PK machine gun	–
3.		0035-0050	Talysh and Tapgaragoyunlu villages (Goranboy district, Azerbaijan)	DShK heavy machine gun and AK-type assault rifle	–
4.		0100-0110	Javahirli and Garadaghly villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
5.		0110-0115	Mehdili and Jojug Marjanly villages (Jabrayil district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
6.		0220-0230	Ashaghy Seyidahmedli and Alykhanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
7.		0315-0320	Kuropatkino village (Khojavand district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
8.		0415-0420	Horadiz and Ashaghy Abdurrahmanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
9.		0600-0620	Talysh and Tapgaragoyunlu villages (Goranboy district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
10.		0605-0630	Talysh and Tapgaragoyunlu villages (Goranboy district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
11.		1015-1055	Talysh and Tapgaragoyunlu villages (Goranboy district, Azerbaijan)	AKM assault rifle and DShK heavy machine gun	–
12.		1215-1240	Chayly village (Tartar district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–

[a] Settlements of the Republic of Azerbaijan included in this information are under occupation by the Republic of Armenia or situated close to the fire point areas.

No.	*Date*	*Time*	*Direction (locality)*	*Weapons used*	*Casualties and damages*
13.		1215-1240	Levonarkh village (Tartar district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
14.		1520-1525	Garakhanbeyli and Alykhanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AKM assault rifle	–
15.		1640	North-east of Berkaber village (Ijevan district, Armenia)	–	A civilian on the adjacent territory of Azerbaijan was wounded
16.	2 August	0255-0300	Yusifjanly village (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
17.		0305-0315	Shykhlar and Bash Garvand villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
18.		0350-0400	Saryjaly village (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
19.		0420-0422	Garakhanbeyli and Alykhanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AKM assault rifle	–
20.		0425-0428	Ashaghy Seyidahmedli and Alykhanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
21.		1120-1140	Kurdeliler village (Goygol district, Azerbaijan)	DShK heavy machine gun	–
22.		2230-2235	Merzili and Giyamaddinli villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle and PK machine gun	–
23.		2240-2245	Kuropatkino village (Khojavand district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle and PK machine gun	–
24.		2335-2350	Talysh and Tapgaragoyunlu villages (Goranboy district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
25.		2350-2352	Kuropatkino village (Khojavand district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
26.	3 August	0035-0050	Horadiz and Ashaghy Abdurrahmanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
27.		0350-0410	Talysh and Tapgaragoyunlu villages (Goranboy district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
28.		0440-0510	Kuropatkino village (Khojavand district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle and PK machine gun	–

No.	*Date*	*Time*	*Direction (locality)*	*Weapons used*	*Casualties and damages*
29.		1640-1705	Jerabert and Karmiravan villages (Tartar district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
30.		1650-1700	Merzili and Giyamaddinli villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
31.		1850-1900	Kuropatkino village (Khojavand district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
32.		2305-2310	Talysh and Tapgaragoyunlu villages (Goranboy district, Azerbaijan)	DShK heavy machine gun and AKM assault rifle	–
33.		2315-2325	Talysh and Tapgaragoyunlu villages (Goranboy district, Azerbaijan)	DShK heavy machine gun and AKM assault rifle	–
34.		2330-2335	Kuropatkino village (Khojavand district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
35.	4 August	0145-0200	Chayly village (Tartar district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle and PK machine gun	–
36.		0500-0510	Jerabert and Karmiravan villages (Tartar district, Azerbaijan)	AKM assault rifle	–
37.		0500-0510	Seysulan village (Tartar district, Azerbaijan)	AKM assault rifle	–
38.		0515-0525	Nemirli village (Tartar district, Azerbaijan)	AKM assault rifle	–
39.		0530-0540	Gorgan and Ashaghy Abdurrahmanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
40.		0545-0550	Horadiz and Ashaghy Abdurrahmanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
41.		0950-1000	Jerabert and Karmiravan villages (Tartar district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
42.		1315-1335	Talysh and Tapgaragoyunlu villages (Goranboy district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle and PK machine gun	–
43.		1340-1400	Talysh and Tapgaragoyunlu villages (Goranboy district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
44.		1540-1550	Kuropatkino village (Khojavand district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–

No.	Date	Time	Direction (locality)	Weapons used	Casualties and damages
45.		1625-1635	Mosesgekh village (Berd district, Armenia) and Alibeyli village (Tovuz district, Azerbaijan)	AKM assault rifle and PK machine gun	–
46.		1750-1800	Kuropatkino village (Khojavand district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
47.		2250-2300	Mehdili and Jojug Marjanly villages (Jabrayil district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
48.		2300-2345	Talysh and Tapgaragoyunlu villages (Goranboy district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle and PK machine gun	–
49.		2315-2335	Aygedzor village (Berd district, Armenia) and Munjuglu village (Tovuz district, Azerbaijan)	AKM assault rifle and PK machine gun	–
50.		2340-2350	Talysh and Tapgaragoyunlu villages (Goranboy district, Azerbaijan)	PK machine gun	–
51.		2350-0000	Aygedzor village (Berd district, Armenia) and Munjuglu village (Tovuz district, Azerbaijan)	AKM assault rifle and PK machine gun	–
52.	5 August	0010-0020	Aygedzor village (Berd district, Armenia) and Munjuglu village (Tovuz district, Azerbaijan)	AKM assault rifle and PK machine gun	–
53.		0355-0405	Ashaghy Seyidahmedli and Alykhanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
54.		0405-0415	Garakhanbeyli and Alykhanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
55.		0535-0540	Horadiz and Ashaghy Abdurrahmanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
56.		1405-1420	Kuropatkino village (Khojavand district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
57.		1420-1425	Garakhanbeyli and Alykhanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
58.		1840-1850	Horadiz and Ashaghy Abdurrahmanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–

No.	*Date*	*Time*	*Direction (locality)*	*Weapons used*	*Casualties and damages*
59.		2110-2125	Jerabert and Karmiravan villages (Tartar district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
60.		2250-2300	Parakavar village (Ijevan district, Armenia) and Kohne Gyshlag village (Aghstafa district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
61.	6 August	0030-0045	Vazashen village (Ijevan district, Armenia) and Gyzylhajyly village (Gazakh district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
62.		0110-0140	Mosesgekh village (Berd district, Armenia) and Alibeyli village (Tovuz district, Azerbaijan)	DShK heavy machine gun and AK-type assault rifle	–
63.		0140-0200	Chayly village (Tartar district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
64.		0345-0355	Talysh and Tapgaragoyunlu villages (Goranboy district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
65.		0405-0415	Berkaber village (Ijevan district, Armenia) and Gyzylhajyly village (Gazakh district, Azerbaijan)	AKM assault rifle	–
66.		0430-0435	Horadiz and Ashaghy Abdurrahmanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
67.		0440-0445	Garakhanbeyli and Alykhanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
68.		0450-0455	Garakhanbeyli and Alykhanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
69.		0450-0455	Mehdili and Jojug Marjanly villages (Jabrayil district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
70.		0510-0515	Ashaghy Seyidahmedli and Alykhanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
71.		0510-0550	Kuropatkino village (Khojavand district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
72.		0540-0545	Shykhlar and Bash Garvand villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–

No.	*Date*	*Time*	*Direction (locality)*	*Weapons used*	*Casualties and damages*
73.		0540-0550	Kuropatkino village (Khojavand district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
74.		2035-2040	Berdavan village (Noyemberyan district, Armenia) and Kemerli village (Gazakh district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
75.		2220-2225	Yusifjanly village (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
76.		2330-2340	Berdavan village (Noyemberyan district, Armenia) and Kemerli village (Gazakh district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
77.		2328-2350	Parakavar village (Ijevan district, Armenia) and Kohne Gyshlag village (Aghstafa district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
78.	7 August	0005-0015	Berdavan village (Noyemberyan district, Armenia) and Kemerli village (Gazakh district, Azerbaijan)	PK machine gun	–
79.		0005-0010	Talysh and Tapgaragoyunlu villages (Goranboy district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle and PK machine gun	–
80.		0020-0033	Berdavan village (Noyemberyan district, Armenia) and Kemerli village (Gazakh district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle and PK machine gun	–
81.		0030-0040	Chayly village (Tartar district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle and PK machine gun	–
82.		0030-0040	Berdavan village (Noyemberyan district, Armenia) and Kemerli village (Gazakh district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle and PK machine gun	–
83.		0045-0058	Berkaber village (Ijevan district, Armenia) and Gyzylhajyly village (Gazakh district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle, PK machine gun and DShK heavy machine gun	–
84.		0415-0420	Shykhlar and Bash Garvand villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–

No.	*Date*	*Time*	*Direction (locality)*	*Weapons used*	*Casualties and damages*
85.		0515-0520	Horadiz and Ashaghy Abdurrahmanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
86.		0750-0810	Gulustan village (Goranboy district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle, PK machine gun and DShK heavy machine gun	–
87.		0945-1000	Orjenekidze village (Krasnoselsk district, Armenia) and Galakend village (Gedabey district, Azerbaijan)	DShK heavy machine gun	–
88.		1000-1010	Parakavar village (Ijevan district, Armenia) and Kohne Gyshlag village (Aghstafa district, Azerbaijan)	DShK heavy machine gun	–
89.		1020-1030	Yusifjanly village (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	PK machine gun	–
90.		1240-1245	Horadiz and Ashaghy Abdurrahmanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
91.		1605-1630	Parakavar village (Ijevan district, Armenia) and Kohne Gyshlag village (Aghstafa district, Azerbaijan)	AKM assault rifle	–
92.		2110-2120	Levonarkh village (Tartar district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
93.		2110-2130	Kurdeliler village (Goygol district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle and DShK heavy machine gun	–
94.	8 August	0030-0040	Parakavar village (Ijevan district, Armenia) and Kohne Gyshlag village (Aghstafa district, Azerbaijan)	DShK heavy machine gun	–
95.		0150-0220	Aygedzor village (Berd district, Armenia) and Munjuglu village (Tovuz district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle and DShK heavy machine gun	–
96.		0205-0230	Javahirli village (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–

No.	*Date*	*Time*	*Direction (locality)*	*Weapons used*	*Casualties and damages*
97.		0230-0250	Parakavar village (Ijevan district, Armenia) and Kohne Gyshlag village (Aghstafa district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
98.		0356-0405	Parakavar village (Ijevan district, Armenia) and Kohne Gyshlag village (Aghstafa district, Azerbaijan)	AKM assault rifle	–
99.		0455-0500	Kuropatkino village (Khojavand district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
100.		1240-1250	Kurdeliler village (Goygol district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
101.		1630-1650	Kurdeliler village (Goygol district, Azerbaijan)	PK machine gun and DShK heavy machine gun	–
102.		2100-2110	Berkaber village (Ijevan district, Armenia) and Gyzylhajyly village (Gazakh district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
103.		2140-2155	Garalar village (Tovuz district, Azerbaijan)	PK machine gun	–
104.	9 August	0020-0030	Garakhanbeyli and Alykhanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
105.		0110-0130	Shykhlar and Bash Garvand villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
106.		0210-0220	Garakhanbeyli and Alykhanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
107.		0220-0230	Gorgan and Ashaghy Abdurrahmanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
108.		0305-0315	Gorgan and Ashaghy Abdurrahmanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
109.		0430-0440	Kuropatkino village (Khojavand district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–

No.	*Date*	*Time*	*Direction (locality)*	*Weapons used*	*Casualties and damages*
110.		0500-0515	Chinari village (Berd district, Armenia) and Aghdam village (Tovuz district, Azerbaijan)	PK machine gun	–
111.		0530-0535	Parakavar village (Ijevan district, Armenia) and Kohne Gyshlag village (Aghstafa district, Azerbaijan)	PK machine gun	–
112.		0620-0640	Talysh and Tapgaragoyunlu villages (Goranboy district, Azerbaijan)	DShK heavy machine gun and AK-type assault rifle	–
113.		2140-2200	Talysh and Tapgaragoyunlu villages (Goranboy district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
114.	10 August	0025-0035	Chayly village (Tartar district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
115.		0025-0040	Jerabert and Karmiravan villages (Tartar district, Azerbaijan)	AKM assault rifle	–
116.		0210-0215	Garakhanbeyli and Alykhanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
117.		0230-0240	Ashaghy Seyidahmedli and Alykhanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
118.		0240-0250	Horadiz and Ashaghy Abdurrahmanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
119.		0400-0420	Chinari village (Berd district, Armenia) and Aghbulag village (Tovuz district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
120.		0605-0625	Talysh and Tapgaragoyunlu villages (Goranboy district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
121.		2220-2225	Saryjaly village (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
122.	11 August	0300-0305	Mehdili and Jojug Marjanly villages (Jabrayil district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
123.		0320-0325	Kuropatkino village (Khojavand district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–

No.	Date	Time	Direction (locality)	Weapons used	Casualties and damages
124.		0335-0355	Talysh and Tapgaragoyunlu villages (Goranboy district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type and AKM assault rifles	–
125.		0420-0425	Shykhlar and Bash Garvand villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
126.		0600-0605	Garakhanbeyli and Alykhanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
127.		2000-2015	Chinari village (Berd district, Armenia) and Kokhanabi village (Tovuz district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle and PK machine gun	–
128.		2020-2035	Horadiz and Ashaghy Abdurrahmanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
129.		2110-2115	Yusifjanly village (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
130.		2155-2215	Talysh and Tapgaragoyunlu villages (Goranboy district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
131.		2225-2240	Jerabert and Karmiravan villages (Tartar district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
132.		2305-2310	Garakhanbeyli and Alykhanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
133.		2315-2320	Garakhanbeyli and Alykhanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
134.		2320-2325	Garakhanbeyli and Alykhanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
135.	12 August	0130-0155	Azatamut village (Ijevan district, Armenia) and Jafarli village (Gazakh district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
136.		0130-0210	Berkaber village (Ijevan district, Armenia) and Gyzylhajyly village (Gazakh district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–

No.	*Date*	*Time*	*Direction (locality)*	*Weapons used*	*Casualties and damages*
137.		0215-0220	Horadiz and Ashaghy Abdurrahmanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
138.		0230-0235	Horadiz and Ashaghy Abdurrahmanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
139.		0255-0305	Berkaber village (Ijevan district, Armenia) and Gyzylhajyly village (Gazakh district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
140.		1220-1240	Kurdeliler village (Goygol district, Azerbaijan)	AKM assault rifle	–
141.		2240-2245	Ashaghy Seyidahmedli and Alykhanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
142.		2300-2315	Jerabert and Karmiravan villages (Tartar district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
143.		2330-2340	Talysh and Tapgaragoyunlu villages (Goranboy district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
144.	13 August	0050-0100	Kuropatkino village (Khojavand district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
145.		0050-0100	Horadiz and Ashaghy Abdurrahmanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	PK machine gun	–
146.		0100-0105	Horadiz and Ashaghy Abdurrahmanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
147.		0248-0255	Parakavar village (Ijevan district, Armenia) and Kohne Gyshlag village (Aghstafa district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
148.		0300-0340	Talysh and Tapgaragoyunlu villages (Goranboy district, Azerbaijan)	AKM assault rifle	–
149.		0340-0345	Mehdili and Jojug Marjanly villages (Jabrayil district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–

No.	*Date*	*Time*	*Direction (locality)*	*Weapons used*	*Casualties and damages*
150.		0345-0350	Ashaghy Seyidahmedli and Alykhanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
151.		1400-1430	Kurdeliler village (Goygol district, Azerbaijan)	DShK heavy machine gun	–
152.		1900-1910	Horadiz and Ashaghy Abdurrahmanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
153.		1900-1925	Kurdeliler village (Goygol district, Azerbaijan)	DShK heavy machine gun	–
154.	14 August	0240-0250	Talysh and Tapgaragoyunlu villages (Goranboy district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle and PK machine gun	–
155.		0250-0300	Talysh and Tapgaragoyunlu villages (Goranboy district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
156.		0335-0340	Gorgan and Ashaghy Abdurrahmanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
157.		0345-0350	Gorgan and Ashaghy Abdurrahmanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
158.		0510-0515	Ashaghy Seyidahmedli and Alykhanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
159.		0510-0515	Kuropatkino village (Khojavand district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
160.		1315-1327	Kurdeliler village (Goygol district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle and PK machine gun	–
161.		2030-2040	Chayly village (Tartar district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle and DShK heavy machine gun	–
162.		2140-2150	Yusifjanly and Giyamaddinli villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
163.		2200-2215	Talysh and Tapgaragoyunlu villages (Goranboy district, Azerbaijan)	AKM assault rifle	–

No.	*Date*	*Time*	*Direction (locality)*	*Weapons used*	*Casualties and damages*
164.		2230-2250	Jerabert and Karmiravan villages (Tartar district, Azerbaijan)	AKM assault rifle	–
165.		2300-2320	Talysh and Tapgaragoyunlu villages (Goranboy district, Azerbaijan)	AKM assault rifle and PK machine gun	–
166.	15 August	0040-0045	Kuropatkino village (Khojavand district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle and PK machine gun	–
167.		0130-0140	Talysh and Tapgaragoyunlu villages (Goranboy district, Azerbaijan)	AKM assault rifle and PK machine gun	–
168.		0430-0440	Talysh and Tapgaragoyunlu villages (Goranboy district, Azerbaijan)	AKM assault rifle	–
169.		0520-0525	Gorgan and Ashaghy Abdurrahmanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
170.		0520-0525	Garakhanbeyli and Alykhanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
171.		0530-0535	Ashaghy Seyidahmedli and Alykhanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
172.		0900-0925	Talysh and Tapgaragoyunlu villages (Goranboy district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
173.		1610-1620	Javahirli village (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
174.		1820-1825	Karagullar village (Dashkesen district, Azerbaijan)	DShK heavy machine gun	–
175.		2350-0000	Yusifjanly and Giyamaddinli villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
176.		2355-0000	Shuraabad village (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
177.	16 August	0030-0040	Voskevan village (Noyemberyan district, Armenia) and Gushchu Ayrum village (Gazakh district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–

No	Date	Time	Direction (locality)	Weapons used	Casualties and damages
178.		0100-0130	Mosesgekh village (Berd district, Armenia) and Aghdam village (Tovuz district, Azerbaijan)	AKM assault rifle and DShK heavy machine gun	–
179.		0410-0415	Horadiz and Ashaghy Abdurrahmanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
180.		0415-0420	Horadiz and Ashaghy Abdurrahmanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
181.		0420-0425	Horadiz and Ashaghy Abdurrahmanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
182.		0445-0505	Talysh and Tapgaragoyunlu villages (Goranboy district, Azerbaijan)	PK machine gun	–
183.		0445-0505	Chayly village (Tartar district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle and PK machine gun	–
184.		0545-0555	Shuraabad village (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
185.		1650-1725	Kurdeliler village (Goygol district, Azerbaijan)	PK machine gun and DShK heavy machine gun	–
186.	17 August	0040-0045	Ashaghy Seyidahmedli and Alykhanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
187.		0055-0105	Gorgan and Ashaghy Abdurrahmanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
188.		0210-0220	Gorgan and Ashaghy Abdurrahmanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
189.		2100-2110	Javahirli and Garadaghly villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	DShK heavy machine gun	–
190.	18 August	0430-0445	Tapgaragoyunlu village (Goranboy district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
191.		0450-0455	Horadiz and Ashaghy Abdurrahmanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AKM assault rifle	–

No.	*Date*	*Time*	*Direction (locality)*	*Weapons used*	*Casualties and damages*
192.		0505-0510	Horadiz and Ashaghy Abdurrahmanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
193.		0505-0510	Horadiz and Ashaghy Abdurrahmanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
194.		1230-1240	Kuropatkino village (Khojavand district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
195.		1240-1305	Gulustan village (Goranboy district, Azerbaijan)	DShK heavy machine gun and PK machine gun	–
196.		1245-1310	Gulustan village (Goranboy district, Azerbaijan)	DShK heavy machine gun and PK machine gun	–
197.		2150-2200	Talysh and Tapgaragoyunlu villages (Goranboy district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
198.		2315-2320	Aygedzor village (Berd district, Armenia) and Munjuglu village (Tovuz district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
199.		2350-2355	Shykhlar and Bash Garvand villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AKM assault rifle	–
200.	19 August	0005-0030	Gulustan village (Goranboy district, Azerbaijan)	AKM assault rifle and DShK heavy machine gun	–
201.		0320-0330	Talysh and Tapgaragoyunlu villages (Goranboy district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
202.		1610-1625	Karagullar village (Dashkesen district, Azerbaijan)	AKM assault rifle	–
203.		1700-1710	Karagullar village (Dashkesen district, Azerbaijan)	SVD sniper rifle	–
204.	20 August	0115-0130	Kuropatkino village (Khojavand district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
205.		0340-0350	Gorgan and Ashaghy Abdurrahmanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–

No.	Date	Time	Direction (locality)	Weapons used	Casualties and damages
206.		1450-1500	Talysh and Tapgaragoyunlu villages (Goranboy district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
207.	21 August	0410-0415	Shykhlar and Bash Garvand villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
208.		2230-2235	Kuropatkino village (Khojavand district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
209.	22 August	0315-0320	Horadiz and Ashaghy Abdurrahmanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
210.		0320-0330	Horadiz and Ashaghy Abdurrahmanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
211.		0935-0945	Horadiz and Ashaghy Abdurrahmanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AKM assault rifle and PK machine gun	–
212.		0935-0945	Orjenekidze village (Krasnoselsk district, Armenia) and Galakend village (Gedabey district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type and AKM assault rifles	–
213.		1910-1920	Talysh and Tapgaragoyunlu villages (Goranboy district, Azerbaijan)	PK machine gun and DShK heavy machine gun	–
214.		2010-2020	Gulustan village (Goranboy district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle and DShK heavy machine gun	–
215.		2300-2305	Yusifjanly and Giyamaddinli villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
216.	23 August	0005-0030	Mosesgekh village (Berd district, Armenia) and Aghdam village (Tovuz district, Azerbaijan)	AKM assault rifle, PK machine gun and DShK heavy machine gun	–
217.		0035-0040	Yusifjanly and Giyamaddinli villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AKM assault rifle	–
218.		0135-0140	Ashaghy Veyselli village (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	SVD sniper rifle	–

No.	*Date*	*Time*	*Direction (locality)*	*Weapons used*	*Casualties and damages*
219.		0250-0255	Horadiz and Ashaghy Abdurrahmanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
220.		0255-0315	Talysh and Tapgaragoyunlu villages (Goranboy district, Azerbaijan)	AKM assault rifle and DShK heavy machine gun	–
221.		0300-0320	Talysh and Tapgaragoyunlu villages (Goranboy district, Azerbaijan)	AKM assault rifle, PK machine gun and DShK heavy machine gun	–
222.		0305-0310	Ashaghy Seyidahmedli and Alykhanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
223.		0510-0520	Horadiz and Ashaghy Abdurrahmanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
224.		2030-2050	Talysh and Tapgaragoyunlu villages (Goranboy district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle and PK machine gun	–
225.	24 August	0120-0125	Yusifjanly and Giyamaddinli villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
226.		0345-0430	Talysh and Tapgaragoyunlu villages (Goranboy district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
227.		0525-0530	Gorgan and Ashaghy Abdurrahmanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
228.		1320-1335	Kurdeliler village (Goygol district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle, PK machine gun and DShK heavy machine gun	–
229.		1805-1835	Karagullar village (Dashkesen district, Azerbaijan)	AKM assault rifle	–
230.		1905-1920	Berkaber village (Ijevan district, Armenia) and Gyzylhajyly village (Gazakh district, Azerbaijan)	AKM assault rifle	–

No.	Date	Time	Direction (locality)	Weapons used	Casualties and damages
231.		2220-2221	Garakhanbeyli and Alykhanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	DShK heavy machine gun	–
232.	25 August	0100-0115	Talysh and Tapgaragoyunlu villages (Goranboy district, Azerbaijan)	AKM assault rifle and DShK heavy machine gun	–
233.		0115-0120	Kuropatkino village (Khojavand district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
234.		0210-0220	Jerabert and Karmiravan villages (Tartar district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
235.		1840-1910	Chinari village (Berd district, Armenia) and Kokhanabi village (Tovuz district, Azerbaijan)	AKM assault rifle	–
236.		2055-2115	Gulustan village (Goranboy district, Azerbaijan)	AKM assault rifle and DShK heavy machine gun	–
237.		2315-2345	Chinari village (Berd district, Armenia) and Kokhanabi village (Tovuz district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
238.	26 August	0510-0520	Kuropatkino village (Khojavand district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
239.		0510-0520	Yusifjanly and Giyamaddinli villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
240.		1835-1840	Garakhanbeyli and Alykhanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
241.		2310-2320	Talysh and Tapgaragoyunlu villages (Goranboy district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type, AKM assault rifles and PK machine gun	–
242.		2315-2325	Jerabert and Karmiravan villages (Tartar district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle and PK machine gun	–
243.		2345-2350	Gulustan village (Goranboy district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle and PK machine gun	–
244.	27 August	0230-0232	Ashaghy Seyidahmedli and Alykhanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–

No.	Date	Time	Direction (locality)	Weapons used	Casualties and damages
245.		0500-0510	Garakhanbeyli and Alykhanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
246.		1510-1520	Karagullar village (Dashkesen district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
247.		2040-2045	Ashaghy Veyselli village (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AKM assault rifle	–
248.		2105-2110	Merzili and Giyamaddinli villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AKM assault rifle	–
249.		2155-2220	Gulustan village (Goranboy district, Azerbaijan)	DShK heavy machine gun and AK-type assault rifle	–
250.		2240-2245	Talysh and Tapgaragoyunlu villages (Goranboy district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
251.	28 August	2140-2155	Nemirli village (Tartar district, Azerbaijan)	AKM assault rifle	–
252.		2340-2350	Talysh and Tapgaragoyunlu villages (Goranboy district, Azerbaijan)	DShK heavy machine gun and AK-type assault rifle	–
253.	29 August	0150-0200	Talysh and Tapgaragoyunlu villages (Goranboy district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
254.		0210-0220	Kuropatkino village (Khojavand district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
255.		0320-0325	Ashaghy Seyidahmedli and Alykhanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
256.		1245-1247	Karchevan village (Agarak district, Armenia) and Kilit village (Ordubad district, Azerbaijan)	SVD sniper rifle	–
257.		1940-1955	Jerabert and Karmiravan villages (Tartar district, Azerbaijan)	DShK heavy machine gun	–
258.		2005-2010	Karchevan village (Agarak district, Armenia) and Kilit village (Ordubad district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle and SVD sniper rifle	–

No.	*Date*	*Time*	*Direction (locality)*	*Weapons used*	*Casualties and damages*
259.		2240-2245	Talysh and Tapgaragoyunlu villages (Goranboy district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
260.		2250-2300	Talysh and Tapgaragoyunlu villages (Goranboy district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
261.		2355-0020	Mosesgekh village (Berd district, Armenia) and Aghdam village (Tovuz district, Azerbaijan)	AKM and AK-type assault rifles	–
262.	30 August	1000-1005	Kuropatkino village (Khojavand district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type and AKM assault rifles	–
263.		1010-1015	Merzili and Giyamaddinli villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AKM assault rifle	–
264.		1500-1540	Gulustan village (Goranboy district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
265.		1745-1755	Merzili and Giyamaddinli villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
266.		2025-2045	Levonarkh village (Tartar district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
267.	31 August	0030-0035	Ashaghy Veyselli village (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
268.		0030-0045	Horadiz and Ashaghy Abdurrahmanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AKM assault rifle	–
269.		0200-0220	Novruzlu village (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
270.		0455-0505	Gorgan and Ashaghy Abdurrahmanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
271.		0915-0920	Ashaghy Veyselli village (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–

Abbreviations: AK/AKM, Kalashnikov rifle; PK, Kalashnikov machine gun; SVD, 79-mm sniper weapon; DShK, 127-mm machine gun.

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Report of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Palestinian People and Other Arabs of the Occupied Territories

Israeli practices affecting the human rights of the Palestinian people in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem

Report of the Secretary-General

Summary

The present report has been prepared by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights pursuant to General Assembly resolution 67/121 concerning Israeli practices affecting the human rights of the Palestinian people in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem. The report examines themes identified in the resolution. These include Israeli policies and practices that are fragmenting the territory and affecting the demography of the Occupied Palestinian Territory and undermining the right to self-determination of the Palestinian people. They also include actions by the Israeli security forces, with a focus on killings and injuries of civilians in the context of hostilities and during law enforcement operations. The report gives significant attention to the extent to which alleged violations of human rights and international humanitarian law are investigated and violators held accountable by both the Government of Israel and Palestinian institutions. The report covers the period from 16 June 2012 to 30 June 2013.

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I. Introduction

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to General Assembly resolution 67/121. In the resolution, the Assembly, among other things, reiterated the need for respect for the territorial unity, contiguity and integrity of all of the Occupied Palestinian Territory and for guarantees of the freedom of movement of persons and goods within the Palestinian territory, including movement into and from East Jerusalem, into and from the Gaza Strip, between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip and to and from the outside world. It demanded that Israel cease all practices and actions that violate the human rights of the Palestinian people, including the killing and injury of civilians. The Assembly also emphasized the need to preserve and develop Palestinian institutions and infrastructure for the provision of vital public services to the Palestinian civilian population and the promotion of human rights, including civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights.

2. The report covers the period from 16 June 2012 to 30 June 2013, with the additional inclusion of relevant background information. The information contained in the report is based primarily on monitoring and other information-gathering activities carried out by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) and other United Nations entities in the Occupied Palestinian Territory. It also contains information obtained from Israeli, Palestinian and international non-governmental organizations (NGOs), human rights defenders and media sources. The report does not provide a comprehensive account of all human rights concerns in the Occupied Palestinian Territory and should be read in conjunction with other recent reports of the Secretary-General and the High Commissioner (A/67/372, A/67/375, A/HRC/22/35 and Add.1 and A/HRC/24/30).

3. Two main themes are covered in the report. First, the report examines Israeli policies and practices that are fragmenting the territory of the Occupied Palestinian Territory and physically separating its population, thereby undermining a number of human rights, including the right to freedom of movement and the right to self-determination of the Palestinian people. Second, it addresses actions taken by the Israeli security forces focusing on the killing and injuring of civilians in the context of hostilities and during law enforcement operations. The extent to which alleged violations of human rights and international humanitarian law are investigated and violators held accountable, by both the Government of Israel and Palestinian authorities, is given significant attention. While the report notes some positive steps taken by the Government of Israel and Palestinian authorities regarding accountability, it points to concerns in a number of areas.

4. The applicable legal framework for the present report is international humanitarian law and international human rights law, as set out in previous reports submitted to the General Assembly and reports of the High Commissioner for Human Rights submitted to the Human Rights Council.[1]

[1] A detailed analysis of the applicable legal framework is set out in A/HRC/12/37, paras. 5-9. This analysis remains valid. See also A/67/375, paras. 4 and 5.

II. Implementation of resolution 67/121

A. The policy of separation and Israeli practices affecting the character, status and demographic composition of the Occupied Palestinian Territory

5. As noted by the Secretary-General in 2012, the right to self-determination is generally understood as having several elements, including a demographic and territorial presence and permanent sovereignty over natural resources. In the Occupied Palestinian Territory, these elements are adversely affected by the presence and expansion of Israeli settlements. The Secretary-General also noted that the fragmentation of the West Bank undermines the possibility of the Palestinian people realizing their right to self-determination through the creation of a viable state (see A/67/375, paras. 10 and 11). Additionally, the Secretary-General noted in his previous report (A/67/372) that evictions and house demolitions, revocation of residency rights, access and movement restrictions and the continued construction of the wall are affecting the character, status and demographic composition of the Occupied Palestinian Territory. As reported below, the same Israeli practices have continued throughout the period under review.

6. A wide range of Israeli policies and practices contribute to the separation of Gaza from the West Bank and within the West Bank itself. These policies and measures include, but are not limited to, the blockade of Gaza, the closure regime in the West Bank, including the continued construction of the wall, the access-restricted areas in Gaza, the demolition of houses and eviction of their inhabitants, the transfer of its own citizens into occupied territory, the revocation of residency rights in East Jerusalem, control of the population registry and the use of Palestinian natural resources. In the case of denying family visits to Palestinians from Gaza in Israeli detention, the responsible Israeli authority explicitly stated that it is a part of a policy to separate Gaza from the West Bank.[2] Israel also continues to implement measures inducing Palestinians to leave their land in Area C and East Jerusalem, further affecting both the territorial and the demographic unity, contiguity and integrity of the Occupied Palestinian Territory. The cumulative result of these measures, policies and practices, despite a few recent positive developments, has been the erosion of the social fabric of Palestine, the undermining of Palestinians' right to self-determination and the constant violations of the rights to freedom of movement, an adequate standard of living, adequate housing, work, education and health.

B. Gaza

Impact of the blockade on human rights

7. According to the Oslo Accords of 1993 and the Agreement on Movement and Access of 2005, the Gaza Strip and the West Bank comprise a single territorial unit, and Israel agreed to provide "safe passage" for people and goods between the two

[2] Attributed to the Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories, Major General Dangot. See Gisha — Legal Center for Freedom of Movement, Update, 6 May 2012.

parts of the Occupied Palestinian Territory.[3] The Agreement, among other things, placed an obligation on Israel to facilitate the movement of goods, including agricultural products, and persons between Gaza and the West Bank. The Agreement prescribed that "passages will operate continuously", and Israel committed that "it will not close a passage due to a security incident unconnected with the passage itself", unless there is "a clear and direct threat to that specific passage". The Agreement also provided that the two crossings, Karni and Erez, could only be closed at the same time if there was a simultaneous threat to both or clear reason to believe that they were "considered as conduits for threats to Israel". In the event of a security incident at one passage, goods and people would be diverted to other crossing points to limit disruptions to Palestinian civilians. Israel has for a number of years, and in particular following the takeover by Hamas of the Gaza Strip in 2007, imposed a blockade, seriously affecting the freedom of movement of Palestinians in and out of Gaza, as well as access within Gaza to the basic goods and utilities needed for an adequate standard of living, housing, education, work and health care.

8. The restrictions on movement of people between Gaza and the West Bank were initiated in September 2000 with the beginning of the second intifada. By March 2005, five months before the evacuation by Israel of the settlements in the Gaza Strip, travel to the West Bank from the Gaza Strip had declined by 98 per cent.[4] Since 2007, Israel has allowed the movement of Palestinians out of Gaza through Israel only in selected humanitarian and other exceptional cases.[5]

9. The movement restrictions are partly a result of the continued control by Israel over the population registry for both the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. According to the Oslo Agreement, formal authority over the population registry was transferred to the Palestinian Authority in 1995, allowing it to grant permanent residency to foreign investors, spouses, children of Palestinian residents and other persons for humanitarian reasons. Israel continued to limit the number of new residents that the Palestinian Authority could allow to register to 2,000 per year. Following the outbreak of the second intifada, Israel suspended the right of the Palestinian Authority to process both permanent residency and change of address applications for Palestinian civilians living in Gaza and the West Bank. This created a backlog of approximately 50,000 cases, which Israel, in 2007, committed to resolving.[6] Approximately 33,000 cases were resolved before applications were again suspended, in March 2009. The suspension means, among other things, that a Palestinian man or woman from Gaza is not entitled to move and live with his or her spouse who is a resident of the West Bank. Israel does, however, allow West Bank residents to relocate to the Gaza Strip in order to reunite with their families on the condition that they "sign undertakings not to seek to return to the West Bank in exchange for permission to travel to Gaza".[7] The cumulative effect of this

[3] "Safe passage", as agreed in annex I, art. X, of the Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement of 28 September 1995. See also Security Council resolution 1860 (2009).

[4] Gisha and HaMoked — Center for the Defence of the Individual, "Gaza prison: freedom of movement to and from the Gaza Strip on the eve of the disengagement plan", March 2005.

[5] IRIN News, "Israeli promises of family reunification fall short", 2 November 2012.

[6] Human Rights Watch, *Forget About Him, He's Not Here: Israel's Control of Palestinian Residency in the West Bank and Gaza*, February 2012.

[7] B'tselem, "Separated entities: Israel divides Palestinian population of West Bank and Gaza Strip", September 2008.

negatively affects the right to family unity and the demographic composition of the Occupied Palestinian Territory.

10. The Government of Israel tightened the blockade in September 2007, following the takeover by Hamas of the Gaza Strip, by imposing additional restrictions on the passage of goods. On 19 September 2007, Israel decided to implement new restrictions to allow only a minimum supply of goods with the intention of avoiding "a humanitarian crisis".[8] As a consequence of the blockade and related closure of the three commercial crossings between Gaza and Israel, Gaza's economy became dependent on the import of goods, such as food items, fuel and construction materials, through tunnels along its border with Egypt. In June 2010, Israel eased the restrictions on imports in Gaza, allowing an increased number of truckloads to enter Gaza from Israel. The policy changed from being one which barred all imports with the exception of a small number of items, to one which allowed the entry of all items with the exception of "dual use" items. The increased amount of goods and material did not substantially improve the livelihood of the Gazan population. In addition, Israel, citing rocket fire from Gaza towards Israel and other security reasons, on five occasions between February and June 2013,[9] closed Kerem Shalom, the only functioning commercial crossing between Gaza and Israel (see A/HRC/24/30, para. 11).

11. During the reporting period, Gaza's exports equalled around 1.5 per cent of the pre-blockade level.[10] This continued to directly impact the economic sustainability, livelihoods and development throughout Gaza. The importation of goods through the tunnels between Egypt and Gaza depend largely on the security and political situations in Gaza and Egypt.

12. Between February and June 2013, the Egyptian authorities destroyed several tunnels on the basis of security concerns in the Sinai and tightened restrictions for crossings of persons through the Rafah crossing, contributing to a shortage of fuel, medicine and goods in Gaza.

13. The blockade of Gaza has adversely affected the right of Palestinians to work. The unemployment rate remained one of the highest in the world, with an average in 2012 of 31 per cent of the workforce in Gaza unemployed.[11] The high level of unemployment contributes to the fact that 57 per cent of households in Gaza are food insecure and around 80 per cent are aid recipients.

14. The blockade has negatively affected the enjoyment of the right to health. It has contributed to a shortage of medicines, a lack of adequate medical equipment and a failure to invest in medical facilities in Gaza (see A/HRC/23/21). Some improvement was recorded in terms of the rate of approval of requests for access to Israel for patients in Gaza, rising to 92.5 per cent of requests approved in 2012

[8] Gisha — Legal Center for Freedom of Movement, "Food consumption in the Gaza Strip — red lines", October 2012.

[9] Ibid., "Kerem Shalom crossing remains closed today and travel at Erez crossing is further restricted", 25 June 2013. Available from www.gisha.org/.

[10] Ibid., "The Gaza cheat sheet: real data on the Gaza closure", 7 July 2013.

[11] See Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, Labour Force Survey 2012.

compared with a low of only 61 per cent in 2008. In addition, in November 2012, Israel approved the construction in Gaza of a hospital funded by Turkey.[12]

15. The blockade has also undermined the right to education by weakening the education system, in particular the ability to build new schools in response to the serious overcrowding of classrooms, owing in part to restrictions on the entry of construction materials. Some 85 per cent of schools in Gaza operate on a double-shift system with shorter school hours. The United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) estimates that 250 new schools are needed at the present time and an additional 190 schools by 2020, in order to accommodate the increase in student population. The 2009 Gaza Recovery and Reconstruction Plan foresaw the construction of 100 new schools, of which 27 have been completed as of April 2013 and 38 are under construction. The United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) expects that the remaining 35 schools foreseen in the Plan will be completed during 2015.

16. As a consequence of Israel's policy of restricting the granting of travel permits to the West Bank for other than humanitarian grounds, and only in exceptional cases, universities and educational institutions in Gaza must resort to videoconferencing with their West Bank counterparts, which greatly limits the opportunities for educational and scientific cooperation.[13]

Access-restricted areas[14]

17. The access-restricted areas are designated by the military as no-go areas for Palestinians, which were first enforced by Israel in 2000 in an area of 150 metres inside Gaza from the fence between Gaza and Israel.[15] In May 2009, this area was extended to 300 metres.[16] Since the ceasefire understanding between the de facto authorities and Israel in November 2012, access to land has increased, but Israeli authorities continue to prohibit access up to 300 metres from the fence in most areas. As of May 2013, the access restrictions were not being enforced as far or as frequently beyond the 300-metre mark as they had been prior to November 2012. Nevertheless, the improved access since November 2012 remains limited and precarious, owing to inconsistent information conveyed to Palestinian communities by various Israeli authorities.

18. Between 21 November 2012 and 30 June 2013, four Palestinian civilians were killed and 112 injured by the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) in the areas up to and at times beyond 300 metres from the fence. In separate incidents during June 2013, three Palestinians were shot with live ammunition by IDF in the access-restricted areas: a day-labourer on his way to harvest watermelons in Jabalia, northern Gaza, was shot and injured by IDF about 400 metres from the fence; a gravel collector was

[12] World Health Organization Special Report, "Right to health: barriers to health access in the occupied Palestinian territory, 2011 and 2012", March 2013.

[13] Pal-Think for Strategic Studies, "The impact of the Gaza blockade on the higher education sector".

[14] The present report provides an update on the continued imposition of access restrictions on land and at sea and should be read in conjunction with the report of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (A/HRC/22/35).

[15] Diakonia International Humanitarian Law Program, Legal Analysis Report 1, "Within range: an analysis of the legality of the land 'buffer zone' in the Gaza Strip", 2011.

[16] Ibid. See also Al Mezan Center for Human Rights, "Displacement in buffer zone three years after Operation Cast Lead". Available from www.mezan.org/.

shot and injured in his upper back about 60 metres from the fence in Khan Younis, southern Gaza; a farmer working on his field was shot and injured in his leg about 400 metres from the fence in the Middle Area of the Gaza Strip. None of these individuals was given prior warning, and there is no indication that any of them constituted an imminent threat to IDF at the time of the shootings.[17]

19. The 1993 Oslo Accords also provided for 20 nautical miles from the Gaza shore as a fishing zone for Palestinians. During the second intifada, the fishing zone was restricted by Israel. At times, fishing by Palestinians was completely prohibited. In 2002, Israel committed to extending fishing up to 12 nautical miles. This commitment was, however, never fulfilled. In 2006, Israel announced that fishing activities beyond 6 nautical miles from shore were prohibited, and in January 2009, Israel reduced the fishing area to 3 nautical miles.[18] The fishing area was then extended from 3 to 6 nautical miles, following the ceasefire understanding of November 2012. However, the fishing zone was reduced to 3 nautical miles in response to rocket fire from Gaza on 21 March. This reduction remained in force until 21 May 2013, when the fishing zone was reset to 6 nautical miles. It is important to note that the reduction of the fishing zone from 21 March to 21 May coincided with one of the most lucrative fishing periods of the year. While the fishermen's catches increased with access up to 6 nautical miles from shore, they were still denied access to the most productive fishing areas, which start at approximately 8 nautical miles. The restrictions have devastated the Palestinian fishing industry. It is notable that while in 2000 approximately 10,000 fishermen were registered in the Gaza Strip, currently there are only 3,500 registered, and at least 95 per cent of them rely on international aid.

20. In recent months, OHCHR has recorded a slight decrease in the number of deaths and injuries as a result of action by IDF in the access-restricted areas on land. Between January and June 2013, 2 persons were killed and 31 injured in access-restricted areas on land, compared with 5 persons killed and 105 injured between July and December 2012.

C. West Bank

Access, movement and continued construction of the wall

21. Israeli authorities, citing security concerns, maintained comprehensive control over Palestinian movement throughout the West Bank, including between East Jerusalem and the rest of the West Bank, and between the centre of East Jerusalem and its surrounding communities. Movement restrictions include the wall, checkpoints, roadblocks, trenches, earth mounds, tunnels/underpasses and gates and a permit regime. These restrictions impact the right to freedom of movement of the Palestinian population and its access to adequate housing, education, health, work, family life and agricultural land and other natural resources. Combined with the discriminatory policies outlined below, this results in a coercive environment that often compels Palestinians to leave these areas, especially for Palestinians living in

[17] Cases monitored by OHCHR.

[18] Al Mezan Center for Human Rights, "Gaza fisherman: life with poverty, harassment and suffering".

Area C — in particular, military zones and the seam zone[19] — but also for Palestinians living in East Jerusalem. The result is the further fragmentation of the West Bank, which undermines the geographical and demographic integrity, contiguity and unity of the Occupied Palestinian Territory.

22. The construction of the wall continues to be a major concern because of the restrictions it entails on the movement of Palestinians throughout the West Bank. If the wall is completed as planned, 9.4 per cent of the West Bank, including East Jerusalem will be isolated from the rest of the Occupied Palestinian Territory. Approximately 62 per cent of the planned route of the wall is already completed. A further 10 per cent is under construction and 28 per cent is planned but construction has not yet been implemented. If construction of the wall were to be implemented as planned, at least 260,000 Palestinians living in the districts of Jerusalem, Jenin, Qalqilya and Bethlehem would be trapped between the wall and the Green Line. Of that number, at least 28,000 Palestinians from rural communities would be surrounded by the wall on all sides. They would be completely isolated from the rest of the West Bank, would live in a closed area, and their movement would be fully controlled by the Israeli military. Another 127,000 Palestinians would only be able to move through one single entry point controlled by Israeli security forces. Therefore, Palestinians who live in those areas are presented with the option of either staying in their homes with severe restrictions on their freedom of movement or moving and living in communities east of the wall.

23. At present, around 11,000 Palestinians live in 32 Palestinian communities located between the wall and the Green Line in the so-called seam zone. The communities depend on permits or special arrangements granted by the Israeli authorities in order to access their own homes. Relatives and friends who need to access this area on a daily basis, or on an urgent or ad hoc basis, for example for a funeral or other major family or social gathering, need different permits. The process for obtaining such a permit is reportedly inefficient and some Palestinians do not obtain permits in a timely manner. In short, the permit regime employed in the seam zone does not allow Palestinian residents to live a normal family life or to study, work or steadily cultivate land.

24. By way of example, a Palestinian family living in Al-Walaja village, located between Jerusalem and Bethlehem, is one of several communities affected by the ongoing construction of the wall in the West Bank. The family members (husband, wife and their three children) live in a house located along the route of the wall. When completed, the family's house will be isolated from the rest of the village. The only access point for the family between their home and the village will be through a tunnel built under the wall by the Israeli authorities. The family fears that this will further diminish their freedom of movement and access to their agricultural lands.[20] It would also isolate them from their community.

25. In areas where the wall is already constructed, Palestinian farmers have been separated from their agricultural lands and livelihood and their access to agricultural lands on the other side of the wall is limited by the Israeli permit and gate regime.

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[19] The seam zone is the section of Palestinian land located between the wall and the 1949 Armistice Line (the Green Line), which has been isolated as a result of the construction of the wall.

[20] See UNRWA, "The International Court of Justice opinion on the wall — nine years later", 10 July 2013.

Farmers are only able to access their agricultural lands west of the wall after obtaining permits to access one of the 74 gates controlled by the Israeli military. Some of these gates are permanently closed during the year and only 52 of them were opened at specific times during the olive harvest in 2012 (October-December). Furthermore, access by farmers to the agricultural lands in the vicinity of Israeli settlements in the West Bank has remained significantly constrained owing to widespread settler violence. Access to those areas is possible only through advance coordination with IDF.

26. Israeli authorities continued to take measures and impose restrictions that isolate East Jerusalem from the rest of the West Bank. Those measures include the continued construction of the wall and the presence of checkpoints. The separation of East Jerusalem from the rest of the West Bank has had a serious impact on the social, economic and cultural life of Palestinians in the city, which was formerly a centre for the surrounding communities. Since September 2000, Palestinian holders of West Bank identification cards have been required to hold a special permit granted by Israel to access East Jerusalem. These permits have been difficult to obtain and can be cancelled without notice.

Demolitions, displacement and revocation of residency rights

27. The destruction of Palestinian-owned property, combined with the displacement of Palestinian civilians, continued throughout the reporting period. Israel, as the Occupying Power, has an obligation to protect the Palestinian population at all times and to administer the territory for their benefit, ensuring that their basic needs are met.[21] Article 53 of the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949 generally prohibits the destruction of property. It states: "Any destruction of the Occupying Power of real or personal property belonging individually or collectively to private persons, or to the State, or to other public authorities, or to social or cooperative organization, is prohibited". According to the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 602 Palestinian structures were demolished during the reporting period in the West Bank, of which 214 were residential structures and 388 agricultural and livelihood structures. Seventy-one of the demolished structures were located in East Jerusalem. The demolitions were in many cases preceded by the forced eviction and resultant displacement of Palestinians, amounting to 894 during the reporting period, including 470 children. Most demolitions are carried out under the pretext that the construction was illegal, while at the same time Israel makes it extremely difficult to obtain construction permits.

28. The revocation of residency rights for Palestinians living in East Jerusalem continued to be a concern. Palestinian residents of East Jerusalem received their status as permanent residents following the occupation of East Jerusalem in 1967.[22] Under Israeli law, residents of East Jerusalem are treated as aliens whose status can be revoked, with no regard for their circumstances as protected persons under international humanitarian law (see A/67/372, para. 38). According to data supplied by the Israeli Ministry of Interior to a local NGO, Israel revoked the residency

[21] Art. 43 of the Hague Regulations and arts. 50, 55, 56 and 60 of the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949.

[22] The status is defined in the Law on Entry into Israel, which also addresses the entry of individuals as tourists and their stay as immigrants.

rights of 116 East Jerusalem Palestinians, including 64 women and 29 minors, in 2012. Also in 2012, Israel reinstated the residency status of 32 East Jerusalem Palestinians.

D. Accountability

29. Under international humanitarian law and human rights law, duty-bearers are obliged both to take appropriate measures to prevent violations of the law and to ensure accountability for violations that are committed, including through the provision of effective remedies to victims. In this context, the Secretary-General notes the second report of the Turkel Commission, which was submitted by the Commission to the Government of Israel on 6 February 2013. The Turkel Commission was established in June 2010 by the Government of Israel following the killing of nine civilians by IDF soldiers during an interception at sea of a humanitarian flotilla sailing from Turkey for Gaza in an attempt to break the naval blockade imposed by Israel on the Gaza Strip. The mandate of the Commission was to examine the mechanisms used by Israel for examining and investigating complaints of violations of the laws of armed conflict according to international law. In its second report, the Commission affirmed the duty to investigate under international law when there is a reasonable suspicion of serious (and other) violations of international law, and affirmed that an investigation must be conducted that adheres to the standards of independence, impartiality, effectiveness, thoroughness, promptness and transparency. These investigative standards have been recognized in previous United Nations reports concerning Israel.[23] According to the information available, the Government of Israel has yet to appoint an independent team to monitor the implementation of the recommendations contained in the report of the Commission. Nevertheless, it is hoped that the relevant recommendations of the Turkel Commission will aid in ensuring accountability and effective remedies for victims of violations of international law in the Occupied Palestinian Territory.

Accountability in relation to the Gaza Strip

30. Serious concerns remain in relation to accountability for violations of international humanitarian law and human rights law that have been allegedly committed by IDF and the de facto authorities in the Gaza Strip. Information available indicates that neither Israel nor the de facto authorities in Gaza have taken adequate measures to assess the credibility of allegations of violations and, where necessary, carry out effective investigations.[24]

31. On 11 April 2013, the Military Advocate General, which is responsible for investigating allegations of violations of international humanitarian law and human rights law committed by IDF, issued a public document indicating that it found no basis for opening criminal investigations into approximately 65 incidents during operation "Pillar of Defence/Pillar of Cloud" and that, with respect to 15 other incidents, additional information was required in order to make a decision about

[23] Goldstone Report (A/64/490); Tomuschat Report (A/HRC/15/50); A/HRC/22/35; A/HRC/24/30, para. 46.

[24] The escalation of hostilities from 14 to 21 November 2012, referred to as operation "Pillar of Defence/Pillar of Cloud" by Israel, was addressed in document A/HRC/22/35/Add.1.

whether to open an investigation. While the decision of the Military Advocate General to publicly issue an update is a positive development, it failed to provide sufficient information about the reasons not to open a criminal investigation into any of the incidents under consideration, in particular in the case of incidents where the evidence suggested that a violation of international humanitarian law had been committed (see A/HRC/24/30, para. 8).

32. The fact that in all of the 65 incidents from operation "Pillar of Defence/Pillar of Cloud" no grounds were found to open an investigation (i.e., there was no reasonable suspicion that a violation had occurred nor that a violation had actually been committed) contributes to concerns about the independence of the investigative process. The fact that the Military Advocate General both provides legal advice and undertakes the prosecution appears to go against a basic premise of accountability, which is that an individual or entity directly involved in an incident cannot investigate it. In that regard, it is regrettable that the Turkel Commission decided to recommend keeping this "dual-hat" of the Military Advocate General, as head of the military prosecution system and legal adviser to the Israeli military authorities. On a positive note, however, it appears that the effort of the Military Advocate General to undertake preliminary investigations into incidents that occurred during operation "Pillar of Defence/Pillar of Cloud" differs from the usual practice of relying on operational debriefings carried out by the commander of the unit that was involved in the incident in question, in order to decide whether to open an investigation. This is consistent with the recommendations of the Turkel Commission on limiting the use of debriefing by the Military Advocate General to an operational function. It is hoped that the recommendations of the Turkel Commission concerning investigations are officially adopted and implemented as soon as possible in order to rectify some of the problems concerning the independence of such investigations.

33. In respect of the de facto authorities in Gaza, it appears that more than seven months after the end of the escalation in hostilities, no measures have been taken to investigate credible allegations of violations of international law committed by the de facto authorities or armed groups in Gaza, or to provide an effective remedy to victims of the hostilities of November 2012. No information is available in the public domain to indicate that credible investigations have been conducted, in particular following from the direct targeting of civilians and the indiscriminate firing of rockets towards Israel, as well as the summary execution of alleged collaborators.[25]

34. The ceasefire understanding that brought an end to the hostilities of November 2012 was generally observed by Israel and the de facto authorities in Gaza. In the period after March 2013, however, there were a number of incidents in breach of the ceasefire. According to the Department of Safety and Security of the Secretariat, 52 rockets and 17 mortar shells were fired from Gaza towards Israel, including 2 rockets that were intercepted by Israeli missile defence systems.[26] While no injuries or deaths were reported, those rockets are generally inaccurate and do not allow their operators to distinguish between military targets and civilians. They are therefore indiscriminate in nature and thus in violation of international law. A Salafist jihadist

[25] This is of particular concern following the findings of the recent report of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (A/HRC/22/35/Add.1).

[26] An additional 2 rockets and 5 mortar shells fell short and landed in Gaza, 2 rockets exploded at the launching site and 16 test rockets landed in the sea.

armed group called the Mujahideen Shura Council claimed responsibility for at least some of the rockets fired. The de facto authorities reportedly arrested at least two persons who were alleged to have been involved in firing rockets following the ceasefire understanding of 21 November 2012. Still, it is estimated that a greater number of members of armed groups are responsible for rocket attacks and there is no information available to indicate that necessary steps have been taken to carry out effective investigations into these incidents and determine all those responsible and hold them accountable (see A/HRC/22/35/Add.1).

Accountability in the West Bank

35. As noted in previous reports, in April 2011, the Military Advocate General announced a policy of automatically launching a military police investigation in every case in which an "uninvolved" civilian was killed by a soldier in the West Bank (see A/66/356, para. 18). This threshold was supported and further developed by the Turkel Commission, which recommended that, in the West Bank, an investigation should be opened immediately in cases of civilian death or serious injury. This was based on the important observation contained in the report of the Commission that the default legal regime applicable during occupation is human rights law. Therefore, all serious injuries and deaths that occur in the West Bank warrant immediate investigation according to the standards of international law. This is consistent with the way in which the legal obligations bestowed upon the Occupying Power have previously been interpreted by the Secretary-General (see A/67/372, para. 17). The Secretary-General welcomes the recommendation contained in paragraphs 68 and 69 of the report of the Turkel Commission that the law regulating the rights of victims to gain access to information about a criminal proceeding applies to all investigative mechanisms covering law enforcement incidents. The recommendations are yet to be implemented by the Israeli Government.

Update on killings and injuries by Israeli security forces

36. In view of the prevailing situation in the West Bank, most of the incidents that arise should be considered within a law enforcement context, namely, that Israeli security forces should abide by the general principles on the use of force by law enforcement officials, in particular, the principles of necessity and proportionality, as reflected in the United Nations Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials, 1990, and the Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials, 1979 (see General Assembly resolution 34/169, annex). In that context, the use of firearms is permitted only when strictly unavoidable in order to protect human life and investigations are required into all uses of lethal force. Investigations into all cases of deaths and serious injury must be undertaken in order to determine whether these incidents were carried out within the framework of applicable international law and standards so as to ensure accountability where any violations were committed and to prevent such casualties from occurring.

37. Israeli security forces operations in the West Bank resulted in the killing of 13 Palestinian civilians, including one woman and three children, in the period from 16 June 2012 to 1 July 2013. Six of the 13 civilians were shot and killed during clashes with Israeli security forces. In the context of clashes between Palestinians and Israeli security forces, on 19 November 2012, Hamdi Mohamed al-Fallah was shot and killed by an IDF soldier at close range in Hebron. According to an

eyewitness account collected by OHCHR, a group of Palestinian protesters were throwing stones at IDF soldiers who were firing tear gas canisters at them. Most demonstrators dispersed, but Mr. Al-Fallah remained. One of the soldiers reportedly dared him to approach, after which the unarmed man started walking towards the IDF soldiers. An IDF solider reportedly shot him in the knee with live ammunition. When he fell to the ground, the IDF soldier reportedly shot another two rounds in Mr. Al-Fallah's chest. Palestinian Red Crescent medics who arrived at the scene were initially denied access by IDF for 20 minutes before being allowed to inspect the victim, who in the meantime had died as a result of his injuries.[17]

38. Seven of the 13 Palestinian civilians killed were involved in incidents that took place outside of the context of demonstrations or clashes. On 29 July 2012, a Palestinian labourer was shot and killed when he tried to cross a checkpoint without a permit while driving with other labourers to his workplace in Israel (see A/HRC/22/35).[17] On 3 December 2012, Israeli soldiers shot and killed a Palestinian man. Prior to that incident, the car which the victim was driving reportedly crashed into an Israeli military jeep on the Nablus-Tulkarm road, causing the jeep to turn over and reportedly injuring some of the soldiers.[27] The Israeli Shin Bet (Israeli security agency) claimed that a number of their agents were travelling in a military jeep in the West Bank when a Palestinian car slammed into them, overturning their vehicle. The Palestinian driver then reportedly got out of the car and began attacking the agents with an axe. One of the agents reportedly shot and killed the Palestinian man. However, according to a Palestinian human rights NGO, the Israeli forces reportedly killed the man after crashing into his car with their military vehicle on the road between Nablus and Ramallah cities in the north of the West Bank. As a result, the victim's car rolled over and was badly damaged in the front. When the victim came out of the car, Israeli soldiers allegedly immediately shot and killed him.[28] On 12 December 2012, a 17-year-old Palestinian boy was fatally shot by a border policewoman at a checkpoint in Hebron. The victim was shot with live ammunition. A medical report indicates the presence of two entry wounds in the chest as a result of live fire shot at close range. Eyewitnesses who gathered after the shooting indicated that the Israeli soldiers did not let anyone collect the victim. An Israeli ambulance came within 30 minutes and took the body to Kiryat Arba'a settlement. At around 23.30, an Israeli ambulance handed the body over to a Palestinian ambulance. On 12 January 2013, a Palestinian man was shot and killed near the wall while attempting to cross illegally into Israel for work. On 15 January 2013, a boy was shot and killed near a fence erected by IDF on the outskirts of Budrus village. On 18 January 2013, a 15-year-old child was shot and killed by IDF soldiers staffing a watch tower at the entrance of Ayda refugee camp. On 23 January 2013, a woman was shot and killed when she was leaving the college where she studied, in Arrub refugee camp.[29]

39. In the first half of 2013, there was a marked increase in the number of civilians shot and killed by Israeli security forces, which further heightened long-standing concerns about excessive force against civilians through the use of live ammunition (see A/65/366, A/66/356 and A/67/372). While nine Palestinian civilians were killed

[27] OHCHR was not able to monitor the case owing to the lack of witnesses.

[28] Palestinian Centre for Human Rights, weekly report on Israeli human rights violations in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, 29 November-5 December 2012.

[29] Cases monitored by OHCHR. See also A/HRC/24/30.

during all of 2012, eight civilians were killed by Israeli security forces in the first six months of 2013.

40. Injuries caused by Israeli security forces increased by 72 per cent by mid-2013, rising to 434 per month from an average of 252 per month in 2012. According to the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, this is the highest monthly average since it began recording such injuries in 2005. In the period from 16 June 2012 to 30 June 2013, 4,117 Palestinians were recorded as having been injured in the course of demonstrations and clashes and settler-related incidents and during ISF search and arrest operations. Of those incidents, 122 Palestinians were injured by live ammunition, compared with 15 such injuries in the period from 1 July 2011 to 15 June 2012.

41. Rubber-coated metal bullets were frequently used by the Israeli security forces in the West Bank as a method of crowd control. Owing to their potentially lethal nature, the Israeli military's open-fire regulations allow their firing only towards demonstrators' legs. During the reporting period, injuries caused by such bullets significantly increased. More Palestinians were injured from the bullets in the first half of 2013 than in all of 2012 or 2011 (1,047 persons compared with 756 and 360, respectively).[23]

42. Between 1 July 2012 and 30 June 2013, IDF conducted approximately 3,000 operations in Palestinian communities in the West Bank, excluding East Jerusalem, and arrested 1,621 Palestinians, including 229 children and 14 women. This appears to have contributed to the reported increase in injuries caused to Palestinians as a result of the manner in which such operations were conducted. They often occurred at night and IDF regularly broke into Palestinian houses, often accompanied by military dogs, while the inhabitants were sleeping. These arrest operations frequently turned violent, resulting in injuries to the civilian inhabitants and damage to civilian property.

43. One arrest operation that merits special attention owing to the number of civilian injuries was that conducted by an undercover unit on 1 January 2013, in an apparent attempt to arrest two Palestinian brothers living in Tammun, north-east of Nablus city, in the north of the West Bank. One of the men was arrested; the other escaped. Shortly thereafter, clashes erupted between youths from the town and Israeli security forces. More than 15 Israeli military vehicles raided the town and clashes lasted throughout the day. According to the Palestinian Red Crescent Society, the operation resulted in the injury of 51 Palestinians, including 4 by live ammunition, one serious injury in the hand as a result of being attacked by a military dog, several injuries from rubber-coated metal bullets and several cases of suffocation from tear gas.[17]

Lack of accountability for Palestinian police and security forces committing human rights violations

44. During the reporting period, the Palestinian Independent Commission for Human Rights continued to receive allegations of ill-treatment, sometimes amounting to torture, by the Palestinian security services. The Commission reported receiving 172 allegations of ill-treatment in the West Bank in 2012, and 98 similar complaints in the period from 1 January to 30 June 2013. OHCHR monitored cases involving cruel, inhuman, degrading treatment and torture committed by Palestinian intelligence agencies in Palestinian detention facilities. OHCHR raised its concerns

with these agencies and is currently working on the revision of internal codes of conduct of the General Intelligence Service and the Palestinian Preventive Security.

45. One Palestinian man was arrested by the General Intelligence Service on 20 February 2013 and was held in detention by decision of a military court. The detainee informed OHCHR that he had been put in solitary confinement on arrival at the General Intelligence Service detention centre in Jericho. He was allegedly forced to stand and was not allowed to sleep for hours. On 22 February, he was handcuffed behind his back and forced to sit on a low chair for 1 to 2 days, after which he was interrogated again. In the following days, he was forced to stand for hours with arms lifted and was deprived of sleep. On 28 February, his hands were tied behind his back and he was suspended by ropes from a window, making him hang 5 cm above the floor. The guards told him to "fly like an eagle". When interviewed, he informed OHCHR that he still suffered from pain in his arms, chest and back. As a consequence of this treatment, he noted that he had agreed to confess to "anything". Subsequently, he was put in solitary confinement for 27 days. During that time, he was allegedly forced to sign a confession that was later used against him in court.[17]

46. With regard to steps taken to ensure accountability, according to the Palestinian Independent Commission for Human Rights, there were at least five committees formed to investigate specific allegations of violations perpetrated by various Palestinian security services. However, in all cases, the findings of those committees were not made public. For example, the findings of the committee formed by the Ministry of Interior to investigate the death of a Palestinian at the Corrections and Rehabilitation Centre of Tulkarm in August 2012 were never published. Moreover, following assaults by Palestinian police against peaceful protestors at the end of June and the beginning of July 2012, the President formed a committee to investigate the incidents. The committee comprised independent figures, civil society organizations and political parties. A report on the incidents was drafted and recommendations were submitted to relevant authorities. When the report was published, information regarding the measures taken against the perpetrators had been omitted. While some police officers were transferred to other positions as a disciplinary sanction, no judicial measures were taken. The Secretary-General finds it regrettable that the work of the committee investigating alleged human rights violations was undermined by the notable omissions regarding accountability.

47. Nevertheless, the Secretary-General welcomes the recent initial steps towards developing accountability mechanisms within the Palestinian security services. On 24 April 2013, the Palestinian Civil Police held consultations with relevant Palestinian authorities to discuss a draft accountability strategy that aims at enhancing general oversight within the Civil Police and strengthening the communication and relationship with the Palestinian public.

III. Recommendations

A. To the Government of Israel

48. **The Government of Israel must take all necessary measures to ensure the accountability of its security forces. It should conduct investigations into all credible allegations of violations of international humanitarian law and human**

rights law. Investigations must be independent, transparent, impartial, thorough, prompt, and effective. Redress for victims must be ensured.

49. **The Government of Israel should lift the blockade of Gaza and allow the free movement of civilians from and into Gaza according to the Oslo Accords, the Agreement on Movement and Access, and Security Council resolution 1860 (2009). Any measures that restrict the freedom of movement and transfer of goods must be consistent with international law.**

50. **Measures to enforce the access to restricted areas must comply with international law. In situations other than hostilities, these measures must be consistent with the United Nations Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials. In the context of hostilities, any enforcement of the access-restricted areas must comply with international humanitarian law.**

51. **The Government of Israel should take immediate steps to respect and ensure respect for the right to freedom of movement for Palestinians in the West Bank, including East Jerusalem. A first step should be to fully comply with the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the *Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory* of 9 July 2004.**

B. To the de facto authorities and Palestinian armed groups in Gaza

52. **Accountability must be ensured for violations of international humanitarian law and human rights law, in particular the killing of civilians, the indiscriminate firing of rockets towards Israel and summary executions, committed by the de facto authorities and armed groups in Gaza. Investigations must be independent, transparent, impartial, thorough, prompt, and effective. Redress for victims must be ensured.**

C. To the Government of the State of Palestine[30]

53. **The Government of the State of Palestine must take all necessary measures to ensure accountability of its security forces. It should conduct investigations into all credible allegations of violations of international humanitarian law and human rights law. Investigations must be independent, transparent, impartial, thorough, prompt, and effective. Redress for victims must be ensured.**

[30] In a letter dated 12 December 2012 to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, the Permanent Observer Mission of Palestine to the United Nations informed that, in line with General Assembly resolution 67/19, the designation "State of Palestine" should be used in all official documents of the United Nations. On 3 January 2013, Mahmoud Abbas, President, State of Palestine issued a decree instructing that "Official documents, seals, signs and letterheads of the Palestinian National Authority official and national institutions, shall be amended, by replacing the name 'Palestinian National Authority' whenever it appears by the name 'State of Palestine', and by adopting the emblem of the State of Palestine. The relevant authorities shall be in charge of monitoring the implementation of this Decree, taking into account the requirements of use".

54. **The Government of the State of Palestine should continue to take all necessary steps to establish effective accountability mechanisms, codes of conduct, standard operating procedures, and other guidance for security forces, in accordance with international human rights law and principles, and ensure their prompt and thorough implementation and operation.**

55. **When the Government of the State of Palestine establishes investigatory committees, their operation should be governed by clear and well-defined rules of procedure, in compliance with applicable international human rights law and principles, and with clear deadlines for the completion of their mandates.**